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CLOSING THE GENDER PAY GAP IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION: THE EQUAL PAY GUARANTEE ACROSS THE
MEMBER-STATES
JARROD TUDOR*

ABSTRACT
The decision by the people of the United Kingdom (“U.K.”) to leave
the European Union (“Brexit”) has created a renewed interest by global
employers in the twenty-eight-member common market. The European
Union has been constitutionally committed to the concept of equal pay
based on gender since its inception in 1957, where the guarantee was first
enshrined in the Treaty of Rome (1957). However, Article 157 (ex 141,
119) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) is
brief on the specifics as to what constitutes pay for the purposes of equal
treatment. The European Court of Justice and other national courts have
been called upon to address various issues including retirement
contributions, part-time workers, life partnerships, gender reassignment,
retirement ages, in-kind benefits, sick leave benefits, maternity leave,
military leave, indirect discrimination, longevity pay, professional
qualifications, and general criteria for compensation. Despite the European
Court of Justice’s broad definition of what constitutes pay for the purposes
of gender equality, employers and member-state governments do enjoy
some exceptions and discretion regarding the application of the equal pay
guarantee.

* Dr. Jarrod Tudor serves as Dean of Wayne College at the University of Akron. He has
held faculty and administrative positions in higher education for over twenty years. As a faculty
member, Dr. Tudor has taught courses in the departments of finance, management, higher
education administration, political science, history, criminal justice, journalism, and paralegal
studies. He holds a J.D. from the University of Toledo, an LL.M. from Cleveland State
University, an LL.M. from the University of Akron, and an M.B.A. and Ph.D. from Kent State
University.
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INTRODUCTION

First, this Article provides the international business and human
resources practitioner with a broad knowledge as to how the equal pay
doctrine is applied in Europe. Second, this Article analyzes the dominant
themes found in a survey of the European Court of Justice’s jurisprudence,
while also identifying the threats facing the equal pay doctrine in the
European Union. Lastly, this Article provides suggestions as to how to
remediate the identified threats to the equal pay doctrine.
A. EQUAL PAY AS A RIGHT AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
The European Union (“EU”) has been committed to equality since the
1957 Treaty of Rome.1 Generally, sex discrimination has always been
prohibited in the TFEU.2 Specifically, Article 157 (ex 143, 119) of the
TFEU prohibits disparate treatment between men and women in regard to
equal pay on an economic basis.3 However, in contrast to many provisions
of the TFEU, Article 157 (ex 141, 119) does not maintain an interstate
equality requirement and is, thus, independent of the provisions of the
TFEU that concern the free movement of workers.4 Regardless, the
principle of pay equality is broadly interpreted in EU law.5 The scope of
EU law on the subject of pay and sex equality has altered the legal
landscape of Europe, which includes both the EU and the European Free
Trade Area (“EFTA”).6 Together, the EU and the EFTA comprise the
European Economic Area (“EEA”).7 Gender equality is a fundamental
right within the EEA.8 Even Switzerland, which is not a member-state of
the EEA, has adopted an equal pay policy in regard to gender equality.9
This is an important reality because the entire EEA must follow the
precedents of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”).10
1. Jill Rubery, Pay, Gender and the Social Dimension to Europe, 30 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL.
605, 605 (1992).
2. MARGOT HORSPOOL & MATTHEW HUMPHREYS, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 513 (Nicola
Padfield, ed., 7th ed. 2012).
3. Id.
4. JAMES D. DINNAGE & JEAN-LUC LAFFINEUR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 1016 (3d ed. 2012).
5. Ingeborg Heide, Sex Equality and Social Security: Selected Rulings of the European
Court of Justice, 143 INT’L LAB. REV. 299, 339 (2004).
6. Id. at 299.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 338.
9. Roland Erne & Natalie Imboden, Equal Pay by Gender and by Nationality: A
Comparative Analysis of Switzerland’s Unequal Equal Pay Policy Regimes Across Time, 39
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 655, 655 (2015).
10. Heide, supra note 5, at 299.
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Experienced by men and women, differential pay has negatively
affected women in the labor market and, in turn, has also affected the
general power and status of women.11 Lower pay for women on a
comparable work level has also increased the economic dependence of
women.12 By the mid-1970s, one of the most obvious employment trends
in Europe was the integration of women into the workforce, especially
during the second half of the Twentieth Century.13 A number of EU
member-states were experiencing an increase in activism by women which
eventually led to the adoption of progressive legislation on the subject of
equal pay for women.14 It, thus, became clear to EU officials that equal pay
legislation was a must, but there existed some debate as to the best process
and form for doing so.15 When crafting the legislation, EU officials
engaged in purposeful discussions with leading women’s organizations.16
The concept of equal pay has been called a human right.17 The
definition of a gender pay gap is the difference between men’s and
women’s average gross earnings, divided by the average of men’s gross
earnings.18 Equal pay, as a doctrine, is a legal requirement in most
countries with liberal market economies.19 There is little doubt that the
anti-discrimination legislation has pushed to narrow the gender pay gap
over the last forty years.20 However, public policies to narrow the gaps in
labor realities between men and women have a controversial past.21 The
social systems of the EU member-states were developed over many years
with different cultures, traditions, and history, yet only recently did these
social systems begin to divorce themselves from the traditional models of
male and female roles.22 Regardless of this shift, however, women still
engage in more domestic work than their male counterparts.23 The 1975

11. Virginija Grybaite, Analysis of Theoretical Approaches to Gender Pay Gap, 7 J. BUS.
ECON. MGMT. 85, 85 (2006).
12. Id.
13. TIM BALE, EUROPEAN POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 31 (3d ed. 2013).
14. FRANCESCO DUINA, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF FREE TRADE 110 (2006).
15. Id. at 113.
16. Id. at 114.
17. Mark Smith, Social Regulation of the Gender Pay Gap in the EU, 18 EUR. J. INDUS.
REL. 365, 376 (2012).
18. Id. at 366.
19. Erne & Imboden, supra note 9, at 658.
20. Marie Drolet & Karen Mumford, The Gender Pay Gap for Private-Sector Employees in
Canada and Britain, 50 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 529, 529 (2012).
21. David Neumark & Wendy A. Stock, The Labor Market Effects of Sex and Race
Discrimination Laws, 44 ECON. INQUIRY 385, 385 (2006).
22. Heide, supra note 5, at 299-300.
23. BALE, supra note 13, at 33.
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Equal Pay Directive (“Directive 75/117”) was the result of the changing
social systems and the activism felt in Europe, which requires equal pay for
work of equal value and allows for comparisons of pay rates across sexsegregated populations.24 Since the EU adopted the Equal Pay Directive,
jurisprudence from the ECJ has modified and broadened the scope of the
general equal pay doctrine.25
The integration of Europe, through EU law, has further pushed the
debate on social progress across the continent.26 The EU has been a force
in promoting gender equality.27 This is difficult to do given that reward
systems can be cultural and vary across member-states in regard to the
“width of pay differentials, ranking of jobs by pay, and the various
principles of pay determination.”28 Although the EU has shown a strong
constitutional commitment to gender equality, the political debate on the
subject still exists.29 Despite the continued integration of Europe and the
promotion of gender equality, there is comment that perhaps a one-size-fits
all approach to gender equality may not work in the EU.30 As additional
member-states have joined the EU, the desire for strengthened legislation to
combat pay inequality has diminished.31 Additionally, several decades of
equal pay legislation and caselaw have not completely erased the gender
pay gap across the member-states.32 One study found that, although the
gender gap has been stable in the EU, the gap varies from a high of almost
thirty percent in Estonia to 4.4% in Slovenia.33 Across the EU, women
make an average of 17.4% less than their male counterparts.34 However,
the financial crisis in Europe has, ironically, been credited with somewhat
closing the gender-based equality gap.35

24. Smith, supra note 17, at 367.
25. Jacqueline O’Reilly et al., Equal Pay as a Moving Target: International Perspectives on
Forty-Years of Addressing the Gender Pay Gap, 39 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 299, 300 (2015).
26. Rubery, supra note 1, at 605.
27. Smith, supra note 17, at 367.
28. Rubery, supra note 1, at 606.
29. Christopher D. Totten, Constitutional Precommitments to Gender Affirmative Action in
the European Union, Germany, Canada and the United States: A Comparative Approach, 21
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 27, 60 (2003).
30. Smith, supra note 17, at 368.
31. Id. at 365.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 366.
34. Joanne Deschenaux, Pay Gaps Persist Throughout Europe, 54 HUM. RES. MAG. 97, 97
(2009).
35. Smith, supra note 17 at 366.
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B. EQUAL PAY AND THE IMPACT OF DISCRIMINATION
In the world of employment, women workers face several hurdles and
disadvantages that can affect salary. One problem women face in regard to
pay inequality is occupational segregation which not only affects women in
Europe, but around the world.36 Such a reality has been called “crowding”
whereby women are limited to only a few occupations and, thus, the labor
supply is higher than normal which pushes down the salaries of workers in
those occupations.37 Some crowding seems to exist in careers that are
focused on caring, nurturing, and service, whereas men dominate manual
and technical occupations.38 There is evidence that women are more
affected by a poor economy than men if layoffs, outsourcing, and stagnant
wages are taken into consideration.39 There also exists evidence that
women are disadvantaged by claims of being over-educated, over-skilled,
and/or assigned to a less demanding or unstable position.40 In contrast,
women are more likely to interrupt their careers and, subject to the
prevailing social model, may accumulate less training, education, and
experience; therefore, limiting their advancement.41 In turn, employers may
be less attracted to female workers, not because of their gender, but because
of the reality that the employer may be required to invest more in the female
worker through advanced training and education.42 Moreover, there is a
lack of international opportunities for women.43 However, there is
comment that the closure of the education gap has also helped close the
gender pay gap.44 Women are more likely to be in positions whereby they
can opt out of work and experience the double burden of motherhood and
work.45 Relatedly, the gender pay gap may be the result of the
undervaluing of work traditionally performed by women.46
These
differences in how work is valued affect women even in retirement, because

36. Grybaite, supra note 11, at 89.
37. Id. at 87.
38. Id. at 89.
39. Elizabeth D. MacGillivray et al., Legal Developments: Gender Issues Now, and
Increasingly in the U.S. and EU Spotlight, 28 GLOBAL BUS. & ORG. EXCELLENCE 79, 83 (2009).
40. Hugo Figueiredo et al., Gender Pay Gaps and the Restructuring of Graduate Labour
Markets in Southern Europe, 39 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 565, 567 (2015).
41. Grybaite, supra note 11, at 86.
42. Id.
43. Margaret Linehan, Senior Female International Managers: Empirical Evidence from
Western Europe, 13 INT’L J. HUM. RES. MGMT 802, 813 (2002).
44. O’Reilly et al., supra note 25, at 302.
45. MacGillivray et al., supra note 39, at 81.
46. O’Reilly et al., supra note 25, at 301.
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retirement benefits are calculated largely based on wages earned while
working.47
Despite the fact that women make up a large share of the workforce,
pay inequality persists and wage discrimination continues.48 There exists
comment that human capital attributes play a role in the development of
gender pay gaps.49 Where these pay gaps exist between men and women,
but are not explained by human capital, it is likely that the pay gap is due to
discrimination.50 Economic pay discrimination exists where two people are
paid different amounts, yet possess the same qualifications.51 According to
Eyraud, a social science researcher, there are three “stages” in regard to the
scope and application of equal pay legislation used to attack economic pay
discrimination, including equal pay for the same job, equal pay for jobs of
comparable worth, and apply equal pay legislation to combat indirect
discrimination whereby unequal value is placed on structural differences
associated with the nature of a female worker’s employment.52 Comparable
worth examines equality across different jobs, even if the jobs have very
different tasks.53 One problem associated with equal pay legislation is
quantifying and calculating the value of equal pay in regard to different
occupations.54 The equal pay for equal work standard could be applied to
work with an equal market value.55 If, however, a reviewing court or
member-state (through the use of legislation) wishes to use comparable
worth as a standard, such an argument is only valid if one believes the pay
inequity in question is a result unrelated to human capital requirements.56
Job evaluation studies can assist reviewing courts in determining value
differences and similarities between different jobs with comparable worth.57

47. Grybaite, supra note 11, at 85.
48. Id.
49. Figueiredo et al., supra note 40, at 566.
50. Grybaite, supra note 11, at 86.
51. Id.
52. Francois Eyraud, Equal Pay and the Value of Work in Industrialized Countries, 132
INDUS. LABOUR REV. 33, 34 (1993).
53. Paula England, The Case for Comparable Worth, 39 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 743, 743-44
(1999) (in her work, the author noted that the countries studied including Sweden, Denmark, and
Finland are members of the EU and EEA, and that Norway and Iceland are members of EFTA and
the EEA).
54. Eyraud, supra note 52, at 33-34.
55. Id. at 41.
56. England, supra note 53, at 748.
57. Id. at 744.
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C. ENFORCEMENT OF THE EQUAL PAY DOCTRINE IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION
It is not simply the governments of the member-states, the EU itself, or
the ECJ and national courts that are responsible for engaging in activities to
promote equal pay for equal work, although pay regulation has been
credited with narrowing the pay gap between men and women in some
member-states.58 The use of trade groups and social partners may be chief
allies in efforts to reduce the pay gap between men and women in the EU.59
The presence of trade unions has narrowed the pay gap between men and
women through collective bargaining agreements which adhere to the
concept of equal pay.60 Trade unions in the U.K. have scored especially
significant victories for workers in regard to equal pay.61 Problematically,
gains made by women through collective bargaining agreements have not
been converted into victories for women in non-unionized sectors.62
Moreover, although firms themselves have been associated with
causing gender pay gaps, there are efforts to find ways to lure new parents
back to work in an attempt to prevent the loss of valuable talent.63 There
exists an incentive for firms to take such an affirmative approach, because
failing to address pay inequality can lead to expensive litigation, even in the
EU.64 Gains associated with the retention of female employees have been
supported by firms providing child care, flexible hours, and maternity
leave.65 Female workers are having fewer children and those with
advanced degrees are becoming less likely to have any children.66 When
firms get women involved in more senior levels of work, employers protect
themselves against potential talent shortages occurring in the upcoming
years.67 More importantly, as women progress in their careers, their
financial positions improve and they become more motivated as the projects
they work on become more interesting.68
In regard to the EU specifically, there is argument that, regionally, the
Scandinavian members of the EEA have done the best at integrating and
58.
59.
60.
61.

Rubery, supra note 1, at 613.
Smith, supra note 17, at 376.
Id. at 370.
Hazel Conley, Trade Unions, Equal Pay, and the Law in the UK, 35 ECON. & INDUS.
DEMOCRACY 309, 309 (2014).
62. Id. at 311.
63. MacGillivray et al., supra note 39, at 79; Drolet & Mumford, supra note 20, at 529-30.
64. O’Reilly et al., supra note 25, at 302.
65. See MacGillivray et al., supra note 39, at 82-83.
66. Id. at 80.
67. Id. at 82.
68. Id. at 81.
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protecting women in the employment world.69 Regardless of whether
firms, governments, trade unions, or individuals attempt to close the gender
pay gap, the gap will not close until the EU and the member-states have
matching priorities on the subject matter.70 One estimate is that full pay
equality will not be achieved until 2058.71
Problematically, gender pay differences have been studied primarily on
a country-by-country basis.72 Despite the fact that twenty-eight memberstates that make up the EU are tied together by a common body of law,
international comparisons on the gender pay gap are complicated and
require not only an examination of law but also an inquiry into employment
structures and reward systems in each country.73
Comparatively, the EU has attacked indirect discrimination with its
constitutional provisions, whereas the United States has a legal corpus that
only applies to purposeful discrimination.74 The treaties that have formed
the constitutional basis of the EU have always maintained an article (Article
157, ex 143, 119) concerning gender equality.75 The United States
Constitution does not reference gender equality.76 Thus, in the United
States, a lack of constitutional commitment to gender equality has made it
difficult for the United States Supreme Court to promote gender equality
and support affirmative action.77 However, decisions by the Supreme Court
have gone a long way in eliminating the debate on gender equality through
the Court’s use of a high level of judicial scrutiny applied to government
policies that create inequality of the sexes.78 This is not to say that the
constitutional commitment the EU has made to pay equality is not without
criticism. There is comment that the “soft law” approach that the EU has
taken has allowed for too much flexibility for each member-state as they are
free to craft their own implementing legislation which meets their specific
conditions and needs.79 One argument is that the EU’s use of Directives as
a legislative tool represents a piecemeal approach and is not effective at
narrowing the pay separation between men and women in the EU.80

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

BALE, supra note 13, at 31-32.
Smith, supra note 17, at 368.
O’Reilly et al., supra note 25, at 302.
Rubery, supra note 1, at 606.
Id.
Totten, supra note 29, at 27.
Id.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 52, 61.
Smith, supra note 17, at 368.
Rubery, supra note 1, at 618.
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II. THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE
The principle purpose of this Article is to discover the various forms of
compensation and remuneration that qualifies under the term “pay,”
pursuant to Article 157 (ex 141, 119) according to the caselaw of the ECJ.
Second, this Article seeks to determine what discretion a member-state has
when structuring its pension systems. Third, this Article seeks to acquaint
the reader, including international employers and employees, with the
various rules concerning the right to equal pay in the EU, which includes
Article 157 (ex 141, 119) and various EU Directives. Fourth, and lastly,
this Article wishes to provide suggestions to the EU regarding how to
further strengthen the right to equal pay for equal work across the various
member-states that constitute the EU.
III. THE DECISIONS OF THE ECJ REGARDING THE RIGHT TO
EQUAL PAY
The decisions by the ECJ on the topic of equal pay includes a wide
variety of topics including covering the scope of employment within the EU
based on both intentional and unintentional discrimination by both memberstates and employers. The ECJ has made decisions concerning the
definition of pay, pay equality, retirement benefits, maternity leave,
redundancy pay, pension rights, service credits, government social policy,
public servant status, and collective bargaining agreements.
A. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 157 AND EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK
STANDARD
Article 157 (ex 141, 119) requires that employers operating within EU
member-states pay their employees equally, based on gender, for equal
work or work of equal value.81 The quintessential case that evaluates
81. Article 173 (ex 157 TEC) states:
1. The Union and the Member States shall ensure that the conditions necessary for the
competitiveness of the Union’s industry exist. For that purpose, in accordance with a
system of open and competitive markets, their action shall be aimed at: - speeding up
the adjustment of industry to structural changes, - encouraging an environment
favourable to initiative and to the development of undertakings throughout the Union,
particularly small and medium-sized undertakings, - encouraging an environment
favourable to cooperation between undertakings, - fostering better exploitation of the
industrial potential of policies of innovation, research and technological development.
2. The Member States shall consult each other in liaison with the Commission and,
where necessary, shall coordinate their action. The Commission may take any useful
initiative to promote such coordination, in particular initiatives aiming at the
establishment of guidelines and indicators, the organisation of exchange of best
practice, and the preparation of the necessary elements for periodic monitoring and
evaluation. The European Parliament shall be kept fully informed. 3. The Union
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Article 157 is Defrenne v. SABENA.82 The most important aspect of the
Defrenne case was that the ECJ found the guarantees under Article 157 to
be directly effective against the member-states and employers that operate
within the member-states, thus requiring the several national courts to
recognize its protections even if the legislatures of the member-states and/or
the legislative branches of the EU had not acted accordingly.83 More
problematically, especially for plaintiffs unlike Ms. Defrenne, as the facts
of the case at bar reflect, the direct effect condition does not apply to
plaintiffs that might file actions against their employers for retroactive
violations unless they had already filed at the time of the Defrenne decision
(obviously, plaintiffs could file freely for violations occurring after the
Defrenne decision of 1976).84
The Defrenne plaintiff was an airline stewardess who, between 1961
and 1968, was paid noticeably less than her male counterparts.85 In 1968,
however, pursuant to a provision in the collective bargaining agreement that
covered her employment (SABENA), she left her position because she
reached the age of forty.86 Shortly after her mandatory retirement, she filed
a claim in a Belgian court for back pay, pursuant to Article 157, due to her
lower and disparate pay in relation to her male co-workers.87
The ECJ spent most of its opinion discussing the scope and merits of
Article 157 (ex 141, 119).88 Specifically, one of the chief responsibilities of
national courts, and the ECJ itself, is to enforce Article 157 (ex 141, 119) to
ensure that firms and member-state governments that have adhered to its
requirements do not suffer a comparative disadvantage against firms and

shall contribute to the achievement of the objectives set out in paragraph 1 through the
policies and activities it pursues under other provisions of the Treaties. The European
Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative
procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, may decide on
specific measures in support of action taken in the Member States to achieve the
objectives set out in paragraph 1, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and
regulations of the Member States. This Title shall not provide a basis for the
introduction by the Union of any measure which could lead to a distortion of
competition or contains tax provisions or provisions relating to the rights and interests
of employed persons.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 173, Oct. 26,
2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
82. Case 43/75, Defrenne v. SABENA, 1976 E.C.R. 0455.
83. Id. ¶ 2 (“Ruling”).
84. Id. ¶ 4.
85. Id. ¶ 2 (“Grounds”).
86. Id. ¶ 26. The Court, however, did not deliver an opinion on Ms. Defrenne’s mandatory
retirement.
87. Id. ¶ 7.
88 Defrenne, E.C.R. 0455, ¶ 1 (“Ruling”).
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member-state governments that have not followed its mandates.89
Secondly, the requirement of equal pay is important to the social progress
and improved standard of living missions behind the EU.90 Regardless, the
ECJ stated that national courts in the EU must guarantee that during the
process of harmonizing EU law, Article 157 (ex 141, 119) is recognized.91
Additionally, the ECJ commented that national courts in the EU must
confirm that the protections of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) are afforded even
when collective bargaining agreements dictate otherwise.92
In the end, although the ECJ did not specifically state as such, Ms.
Defrenne and plaintiffs that had already filed claims at the time of the
decision, could recover for back pay if they were successful in their claims
because the provisions of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) were to be fully
recognized by January 1, 1962.93
In Fletcher v. Clay Cross Limited, the British Court of Appeals
attempted to mesh the United Kingdom’s Equal Pay Act of 1970 with
Article 157 (ex 141, 119).94 The Plaintiff, Ms. Fletcher, was working as a
sales clerk with two others in the same position, a man and another woman,
for less pay than her male counterpart, but was paid the same amount as her
female counterpart.95 Initially, she was paid eight pounds less per week
than her newly hired male counterpart because the latter would not accept
less than forty-three pounds per week, which was what he was making with
his old employer.96 Shortly after the male’s hiring, the employer raised all
wages by six pounds per week, which still left the disparity in place at eight
pounds per week.97 The defendant firm then raised the wages of the two
women, but not the male employee, by almost two and one half pounds per
week, pursuant to a study of the value of work at the workplace.98 It was at
this point that Ms. Fletcher brought a claim of pay discrimination against
her employer under the British Equal Pay Act.99
All three Judges wrote opinions that were unanimous in finding that
Ms. Fletcher’s employer had violated the Equal Pay Act of 1970.100 Lord

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id. ¶ 2.
94. Fletcher v. Clay Cross Ltd., 1978 C.M.L.R. 1.
95. Id. at 2.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2.
100. Fletcher, C.M.L.R. 1, at 6, 10, 13.
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Denning found that there were no material differences between Ms.
Fletcher and her male counterpart that would justify the disparity in
salary.101 Such arguments made by the employer to justify the disparity in
pay, such as the lack of a suitable labor pool and/or the higher amount of
salary was required because it was equal to what the male worker was
making at his old place of employment were immediately discounted as
unsuitable excuses.102
Additionally, Lord Denning borrowed from
American jurisprudence on the American Equal Pay Act of 1963 in holding
that a British employer could be held responsible for a violation, even if it
was not the employer’s goal to discriminate.103
Lord Lawton, after extensive recitation of both British and American
jurisprudence on the issue of equal pay based on gender, found that even if
the employer were able to use, as a justification, the lack of a labor pool for
the sales clerk position, a labor shortage did not exist in this particular case
when three applicants applied for the job but only one was interviewed and
hired (the male applicant).104 Perhaps most importantly, Lord Lawton
noted that although British and American jurisprudence allows for grounds
to pay men and women disparately if unrelated to gender, the United
Kingdom Equal Pay Act disallows such grounds.105 Relatedly, both Lord
Denning and Lord Lawton stressed the need to keep domestic law and
TFEU law harmonious.106
Lord Browne similarly held that although it was not the intent of the
employer to discriminate on the basis of gender when paying Ms. Fletcher
and the male counterpart, the very effect of disparate pay leads to a
violation of the British law.107
B. INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION
In one of its more prescriptive cases, Regina v. Seymour-Smith and
Perez, four prominent questions were raised and answered by the ECJ
regarding the doctrine of equal pay for equal work.108 As one might
imagine, the use of statistics is an extremely effective way to show that a
member-state’s policy has a disparate impact on men or women. In
Seymour-Smith & Perez, while answering the first question, the ECJ stated
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that to show a member-state’s policy reflects indirect discrimination and
thus a violation of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), a national court must verify
that the statistics reflect that a considerably smaller percentage of women
than men are able to fulfill the requirements of that member-state’s
policy.109 However, even if indirect discrimination is shown through a
statistically considerable difference, if a member-state can show that the
policy is justifiable by other objective factors, none of which are related to
gender, then indirect discrimination does not exist.110
According to the ECJ, the first step in determining whether indirect
discrimination exists in violation of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) is to discover
whether the policy in question creates a more unfavorable impact on
women than men.111 Second, when using statistics, a reviewing court must
determine that there are proper proportions of men and women to compare
in regard to the policy in question; however, it is not sufficient to look at the
number of people affected because that might depend on the number and
percentage of people working in the member-state.112 Third, the national
court must establish that the statistics reveal a relatively constant disparity
between men and women over a long period of time to find a case of sexbased discrimination.113 Specific to the facts in Seymour-Smith & Perez,
the ECJ found that when a member-state policy affects 77.4% of men, but
only 68.9% of women, such figures do not show that a considerably smaller
percentage of women are more unfavorably disadvantaged, which reflects
indirect discrimination in violation of Article 157 (ex 141, 119).114
The plaintiffs in Seymour-Smith & Perez believed that they were
unfairly dismissed and submitted a claim to a U.K. administrative court
assigned with determining whether an employee had been unfairly
dismissed, and if such a finding resulted, was charged with issuing one of
two remedies, including reinstatement or compensation.115 According to
U.K. law at the time, an employee who believed he or she has been
terminated unjustly could petition the administrative court, so long as the
employee had maintained employment for a total of two years.116 Both
plaintiffs had worked for their employers for roughly one and one-half
years, but had not worked the full two years as required by U.K. law, which
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would enable them to petition the administrative court.117 The plaintiffs
argued that Article 157 (ex 141, 119) was violated by the U.K.’s two-year
policy in that it adversely affected more women than men.118
The second significant question asked in Seymour-Smith & Perez was
whether a judicial award of compensation in an unfair dismissal case was
within the scope of pay pursuant to Article 157 (ex 141, 119).119 Although
the plaintiffs contended that this question should be answered in the
affirmative, the U.K. government suggested that such compensation was
outside the scope of pay and was merely a remedy for an employer’s breach
of a working condition.120 The ECJ held, however, that Article 157’s
definition of pay included various forms of consideration, even indirect
consideration, as the result of employment.121 While examining its own
jurisprudence, the ECJ remarked that it had previously held that
compensation may be received when an employee is terminated.122 To
answer the second question, the ECJ held that compensation from an
administrative court, in the form of both an actual award and a
compensatory award, is designed to give the employee what he or she
would have received had the employer not unfairly terminated his or her
employment, and was within the scope of the term “pay” for purposes of
Article 157 (ex 141, 119).123 On this point, the ECJ further strengthened its
holding by stating that compensation received through a statutory right,
such as the case here in the form of a judicial award, would be treated the
same as if the compensation was directly received by an employee pursuant
to an employment contract.124
The third question posed to the ECJ concerned technical grounds of
law and the separation of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) and Directive 76/207.125
According to the ECJ, when an applicant is seeking reinstatement from an
administrative court for unfair dismissal, Directive 76/207, which pertains
more so to working conditions including the possibility of dismissal and the
right to take up employment, applies.126 However, when an employee who
believes he or she has been unfairly dismissed and is seeking financial
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compensation for lost remuneration, Article 157 (ex 141, 119) applies.127
In the case at bar, because the plaintiffs were seeking financial
compensation, the case should be governed by Article 15 Article 157 (ex
141, 119) 7.128
The fourth question in Seymour-Smith & Perez centered on what would
substantiate an objective justification by a member-state for the purpose of
indirect discrimination.129 The ECJ stated that if a member-state is able to
show that its social policy, espoused in legislation, is suitable and necessary
for achieving that aim, then even if the legislation far more negatively
affects women than men, the legislation in question does not violate Article
157 (ex 141, 119).130 In regard to the facts of the case at bar, the ECJ found
that the social policy in question, creating a two-year time period before an
employee can bring a claim for unfair dismissal to encourage the
recruitment of employees who wish to stay with the employer for a long
period, was a legitimate aim for a member-state’s social policy.131
Regardless of the legitimate aim, a member-state must take into account
other means by which to achieve that social policy.132 Although the ECJ
specified that member-states should have broad discretion when
determining the best legislative methods by which to achieve its social and
employment policies, this discretion cannot be exercised in a way that
frustrates the spirit of EU law.133 In such cases, the member-state has the
burden of proof to show that its use of discretion when developing its social
policy through legislation is not related to discrimination based on gender
and must also justify the means chosen to achieve its legislative aims.134
Here, the ECJ believed that a mere concern in regard to the recruitment of
employees was not enough to justify the two-year rule in British law and
immunize this legislative aim by a blanket finding that it is unrelated to
gender discrimination.135
C. RETIREMENT PLANS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In another early case, Worringham v. Lloyd’s Bank, the ECJ not only
addressed the issue of retirement contributions as a form of “pay” in regard
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to Article 157 (ex 141, 119), but also the temporal effect of an ECJ
decision, finding an employer’s breach of Article 157 (ex 141, 119).136 The
plaintiffs in Worringham believed that their employer violated the tenets of
Article 157 (ex 141, 119) and Directives 75/117 and 76/207 because the
employer required male employees to contribute 5% toward their pension
plans, paid the male employees an extra 5%, yet immediately deducted that
same additional 5% of salary.137 Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that
the employer moved that money directly into the pension fund while female
employees were not required to pay 5% toward their pension account but
were not paid the additional 5% as the male employees were nor was 5%
deducted from the female workers’ pay.138 Although this dual retirement
contribution system did not yield a direct difference in regard to the pension
system, the additional 5% paid to the male employees affected other
benefits associated with employment including redundancy payments,
unemployment benefits, family allowances, contributions equivalent
premiums, and mortgage and credit facilities.139
The ECJ made it clear that pension contributions are considered within
the scope of the term “pay” for the purposes of Article 157 (ex 141, 119),
which includes ordinary wages and salaries, cash, and in-kind contributions
that an employee receives either directly or indirectly from an employer.140
Furthermore, also within the scope of the term “pay” would be the benefits
that accrue from having a larger salary, even if that additional salary is
deducted from a worker’s take-home pay because that additional salary
increases other salary-related benefits and/or social benefits.141
Additionally, the ECJ found the employer to have violated Directive 75/117
in implementing the dual retirement contribution system as that Directive
applies to the same work in which the male and female employees were
engaged in Worringham.142
Given that Worringham was an early case, the ECJ was charged with
determining whether Article 157 (ex 141, 119) had direct effect, meaning
that member-states had to adhere to the principle of equal pay for equal
work, without implementing legislation when applied to retirement plans.143
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According to the ECJ, the unequal gross pay, despite the immediate
deduction that male workers face for which that amount is contributed to
their pension accounts, is an intolerable source of discrimination that
Article 157 (ex 141, 119) was envisioned to extinguish.144 The ECJ held
that Article 157 (ex 141, 119) was directly effective and thus member-state
governments are charged with making sure the equal pay for equal work
doctrine is adhered to within their political boundaries.145 As well, national
courts may rely on Article 157 (ex 141, 119) without implementing
legislation to provide relief to plaintiffs when there exists disparity in
relation to retirement plans.146
Lastly, the ECJ was required to decide whether their holding, that the
employer in the case at bar had violated Article 157 (ex 141, 119) and
Directive 75/117, would be limited in scope of time so that additional
plaintiffs could not come forth alleging gender discrimination in regard to
the equal pay for equal work doctrine.147 The ECJ stated there were two
reasons, both required, as to why a judgment should not apply retroactively
including that, first, the employers in a similar situation and the memberstates were led to believe over a long period of time that their prior
discriminatory actions were not violating the tenets of Article 157 (ex 141,
119).148 Second, there existed policy reasons as to why retroactive effect
would not be desirable due to the existence of important questions of legal
certainty that could affect many other parties other than the litigants.149
Regardless, the ECJ found that neither of these conditions existed and
refused to place a temporal restriction on their judgment in Worringham.150
D. RETIREMENT PLANS AND AGE DIFFERENCES
The focus of Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange was the difference
between the pension ages of men and women and the relationship between a
member-state’s statutory pension system and a privately managed pension
system.151 In Barber, the plaintiffs included an estate and the widow of a
deceased employee who was made redundant by his employer at an age
whereby he was only eligible for a deferred pension, a statutory redundancy
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payment, and an ex gratia payment from his employer.152 The worker in
question, Mr. Barber, was employed by Guardian which maintained a
wholly funded pension system with no employee contributions but,
according to the provisions of the pension, male workers were not eligible
for a pension until age sixty-two, whereas female workers were eligible at
age fifty-seven.153 The statutory pension system, as crafted by the U.K.
government, allowed men to retire with a pension at sixty-five and women
at sixty.154 Workers at Guardian, pursuant to the pension system, were
eligible for a deferred pension if they had reached at least age forty and had
worked for the firm for at least ten years.155 However, workers facing
redundancy could gain an immediate pension at age fifty-five, if male, and
fifty, if female, at the time of the redundancy declaration.156 As for the
facts in the case at bar, Mr. Barber was declared redundant at age fifty-two
making him eligible only for a deferred pension, yet his female counterpart
would have been eligible for an immediate pension under the same
circumstances.157
The ECJ in Barber put forth several rules concerning the interplay
between different ages for different work-related benefits and pension
systems either crafted by an employer or a member-state. First, the ECJ
held that pay associated with a declaration of redundancy is within the
scope of the term “pay” pursuant to Article 157 (ex 141, 119).158
According to the ECJ, compensation related to a finding of redundancy, be
it from a contract provision, a statutory provision, or via an ex gratia
payment, is still pay for the purposes of Article 119, which requires
compensation equality between men and women.159 In regard to ex gratia
payments which an employer makes without an obligation to do so, Article
157 (ex 141, 119) still requires equality.160 Second, the ECJ stated that
pension benefits are included within the scope of Article 157’s term “pay”
even if the employer contracts with a private entity to manage the pension
scheme.161 Relatedly, the pension benefits in question are still within the
guise of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) despite the fact that the pension corpus is
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managed in the form of a trust and administered by trustees which are
independent of the employer.162 The ECJ contended that because the
privately-contracted pension system fulfills the same function as a statutory
pension system, and also because the contributions paid by employees to
the private pension fund in lieu of being paid to the government-sponsored
pension system, Article 157 (ex 141, 119) would encompass the former.163
The fourth point made by the ECJ in Barber may have been the most
significant. The ECJ held that in cases whereby an employee is declared
redundant, Article 157 is violated if there are different ages assigned to men
and women for eligibility for an immediate pension.164 On the issue of
pensions associated with redundancy declarations before the age of pension
eligibility, the ECJ was chiefly concerned with transparency in that
member-states and that their associated national courts have a responsibility
to eliminate all discrimination on grounds of gender, including making sure
judicial review was possible and effective.165 Relatedly, the ECJ charged
national courts with assessing and comparing all possible forms of
compensation, pursuant to Article 157 (ex 141, 119).166 The ECJ also
found Article 157 (ex 141, 119) directly effective, requiring equality in
regard to pension systems; thus, national courts can use Article 157 (ex 141,
119) without implementing legislation from a member-state to hold various
forms of compensation systems intolerable when one gender is adversely
affected.167 Furthermore, the ECJ found the privately-contracted pension
scheme to violate Article 157 (ex 141, 119) due to the different pension
eligibility ages between men and women even if there was an age-eligibility
difference associated with the government-sponsored pension system.168
E. IN-KIND BENEFITS
In a fairly short-winded case, the ECJ held that an employer violates
Article 157 (ex 143, 119) if it grants in-kind benefits to male employees
upon retirement, but fails to grant the same to female employees.169 In
Garland v. British Rail, the ECJ found that Article 157 (ex 141, 119)
covered in-kind benefits upon retirement in the form of free travel facilities
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on railroads to the spouse and children of former railroad workers.170 The
ECJ found a violation of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) although, pursuant to a
contract, the employer was not obligated to provide such benefits to retired
workers.171 The ECJ also commented that the nature of the benefits would
be analyzed because there was a clear form of discrimination when male
workers were afforded the free travel facilities, considered within the scope
of pay for the purposes of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), yet female workers
were.172 Interestingly enough, once the policy was deemed to have violated
Article 157 (ex 141, 119), the ECJ did not find it necessary to determine if
the employer’s policy violated either Directive 75/117 or 76/207.173
Directive 2000/78 generally requires equal treatment in matters of
employment and occupation, but does not apply to benefits that are the
result of a member-state’s social security or social protection scheme or a
payment from a member-state by which the design is to provide access to
employment or the purposes of Article 157 (ex 141, 119).174 Directive
2000/78 specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion,
disability, age, or sexual orientation and requires equal treatment on matters
of employment and occupation either by direct or indirect means.175 This
Directive specifically addresses employment conditions, dismissals, pay,
and working conditions whereby employers must treat employees equally
based on the suspect classifications previously identified, but does not apply
to payments made by the governments of member-states which, again,
include social security or pension schemes.176 In Germany v. Dittrich, the
ECJ was asked to determine if statutorily-mandated assistance provided to
public servants by the German government was within the scope of the
equal treatment requirements of Directive 2000/78.177
The German law in question provided various benefits, such as health
care benefits (including benefits for maternity and illness-related
conditions) for partners and other family members and to same-sex partners
who were government employees.178 German law, however, was amended
to exclude civil partners from the health care benefits provisions.179
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According to the ECJ, Directive 2000/78 applies to all employees
whether employed in the public or private sectors in regard to pay.180 As
well, the ECJ held that health care benefits afforded to spouses and their
family members are generally included within the term “pay” for the
purposes of Article 157 (ex 141, 119).181 However, the ECJ stated that to
determine if a benefit acquires the full protection from Article 157, the
benefit must be afforded to the worker because of his or her employment
and must be paid by the employer, specifically.182 In Dittrich, the ECJ held
that because the health care benefits were part of Germany’s statutory
regime, and not directly afforded to an employee from an employer, nor did
the benefits supplement an existing social benefit, the health care benefits in
this case, specifically, were not within the scope of “pay.”183 Regardless,
the ECJ left the national courts to determine if the health care benefits in
question, in a case like Dittrich, are funded by legislative mandate or by a
public employer.184
F. PART-TIME WORKERS AND PENSIONS
In Jenkins v. Kingsgate, the ECJ entertained a referred question from a
British administrative court as to whether an employer violated Article 157
(ex 143, 119) by paying part-time workers a lower hourly rate than full-time
workers when virtually all part-time workers were female.185 At one time,
Kingsgate, the employer, paid both full-time (those working forty hours per
week) and part-time workers the same hourly rate, yet, in 1975, it decided
to pay a higher hourly wage to full-time workers.186 According to British
law at the time, specifically the Equal Pay Act of 1970, employers were
required to pay men and women equally when “a woman is employed in
like work with a man in the same employment.”187 However, the British
administrative court found that such equality was not required between
male and female employees when an employer can prove a material
difference between the contracts of the male and female workers and that
material difference is unrelated to gender.188 The plaintiff, who was a part-
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time worker, rested much of her case on the fact that all but one part-time
employee was male and that male employee had just recently retired and
was allowed to return performing brief stints of work.189
The ECJ held that a mere difference in hourly pay rates between parttime and full-time workers is not a per se violation of Article 157 (ex 141,
119), assuming that the part-time and full-time pay rates are applied equally
to male and female workers in those categories.190 However, the ECJ
hinted that an employer would be required to show that the hourly pay rates
were unrelated to sex discrimination and that the same pay rates were
objectively justified on grounds such as encouraging full-time employment
over part-time employment.191 The ECJ did, however, state that if an
employer cannot show that, where a considerably smaller percentage of
women are full-time employees due to the difficulties associated with
arranging work schedules, there are reasons for the pay differentials
unrelated to gender, Article 157 (ex 141, 119) would be infringed.192 The
ECJ did allow the national courts to decide if the case facts and employer’s
intention was to treat male and female workers differently through its
remuneration policies.193
In Bilka v. Weber von Hartz, the ECJ put forth several crucial
statements about pensions, the differences between part-time and full-time
employees, and employees’ rights to equal pay for equal work under Article
157 (ex 141, 119).194 First, the ECJ held pension schemes that are not
mandated by a member-state’s statutory provision, but instead, as the result
of negotiations between a firm and its employees, are within the scope of
Article 157’s “pay” term.195 Second, if the private sector firm excludes
part-time workers from its pension system, and the pension system affects a
far greater number of women than men, the pension system violates the
requirements of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), unless the employer can show
that the pension scheme is the result of objectively justified factors that are
unrelated to gender discrimination.196 According to the ECJ, this is
especially true if, in contrast to men, a much lower percentage of women
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work full-time, and thus, make up a larger percentage of part-time workers
when considering that women have greater difficulties in the work world.197
Third, however, if an employer can show that the reason for excluding
part-time workers from its pension system was to discourage part-time
work and make full-time work more attractive, such a reason would
constitute an objective reasonable factor under Article 157, and thus, not
constitute a breach of the Article.198 The ECJ, in the case at bar, agreed
with the employer that such a policy, in regard to its pension scheme with
the design of promoting full-time work, was a policy irrespective of gender,
and thus, appropriate to meet the firm’s objective.199 Interestingly, the
respondent firm suggested that part-time employees are less likely to agree
to work in the late afternoons and on Saturdays, and in order to ensure an
adequate workforce, full-time employment was more likely to allow for
coverage of those periods of time.200 As well, the ECJ stated that the
European Commission has suggested that, in regard to the equal pay for
equal work doctrine, member-states need not require employers within that
member-state to account for the family responsibilities of their workers.201
The stance by the ECJ and the Commission were in stark contrast to the
arguments made by the plaintiff, Ms. Weber, who articulated that women
suffer disadvantages in the workplace because of the exclusion of women
from full-time work, and that when women take time to care for family
members while working part-time, that period of part-time employment
should be considered full-time employment for the purposes of an
employer’s pension scheme.202 Regardless, the ECJ, agreeing with the
European Commission, held that employers are under no obligation to craft
a pension scheme that takes into consideration difficulties maintained by
those with family obligations.203
The ECJ did not dwell much on the facts of its Bilka decision. Ms.
Weber worked at Bilka, a department store chain, for fifteen years, but only
worked full-time for the first eleven years, making her ineligible for a
pension.204 The pension system negotiated between the workers at Bilka
and the firm required fifteen years of full-time employment within a
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twenty-year period.205 Although proffered by Bilka, yet without much
notice by the ECJ, the firm stated that no discrimination occurred since the
great majority (81.3%) of all pensions granted within its group were paid to
women and only 72% of all employees at Bilka were women.206
Perhaps the best articulation of the scope of direct discrimination in
regard to Article 157 (ex 141, 119) is in Nikoloudi v. OTE.207 Pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement in Greece, only females could be part-time
cleaners within the framework of a fixed-term contract, though, it was also
possible to become a fixed-term contract worker if a cleaner were taking on
the dependent of a deceased worker due to family problems resulting from
the death.208 The plaintiff, Ms. Nikoloudi, a female cleaner, was hired as a
part-time cleaner from 1978 until 1996, when her contract was converted to
full-time, thus, making her eligible for a pension in 1998.209 She later
brought an action in a Greek court alleging violation of Article 157 (ex 141,
119), claiming that since she was limited to only part-time employment for
eighteen years, she was disadvantaged, as evidenced by a lower pension
payment.210
The ECJ first contended that it did not make a difference that no male
worker was engaged in the same work as the plaintiff and that she may still
bring her claim for a violation of EU law, and, in regard to finding
comparisons, the plaintiff need not to find workers engaged in exactly the
same form of work to enforce the principle of equality.211 The defendant,
OTE, a labor organization, argued that the part-time cleaner position was
justified due to the small physical area needed for cleaning and that the
position should be limited only to women to meet their specific needs.212
Although the ECJ conceded that categories of workers can be reserved
specifically for a particular gender and such a designation does not itself
create a form of direct discrimination, the disadvantageous treatment of
those in that gender-specific work category due to general unfavorable
treatment as a worker or in regard to equal pay, does constitute direct
discrimination.213 Problematically for the plaintiff, it was possible for a
female worker to seek full-time employment, just as Ms. Nikoloudi had
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done for the last two years, and, in conjunction with the fact that the same
rate of pay existed for both part-time and full-time workers, ECJ found no
direct discrimination.214 Relatedly, the ECJ also found that even if parttime workers were paid a lower rate than full-time workers, but women
were still eligible for full-time employment, no direct discrimination would
exist so long as the employer could objectively justify the difference in pay
between full-time and part-time workers, and that the difference was
unrelated to gender.215 Additionally, despite the fact that part-time workers
were paid less than their full-time counterparts, no direct discrimination
existed, again, so long as full-time employment was open to women.216
Despite its holding on the subject of direct discrimination, the ECJ held
that if there is evidence that the gender-specific category of employment,
here the reservation of part-time cleaning positions for women, has a
disadvantageous effect on a particular gender, a claim of indirect
discrimination can be substantiated.217 However, if an employer (or labor
organization) can show that the disadvantageous impact on part-time
workers is due to a reality not related to gender, then indirect discrimination
does not exist.218 In regard to indirect discrimination, the ECJ stated that
although member-states have flexibility making choices in regard to their
social policies and social protection, these social systems cannot bring
about discrimination based on gender.219
For the ECJ, the length of service question, in regard to qualifying for a
state pension, was much more challenging. Here, the ECJ ruled that if the
total exclusion of part-time employment for the purpose of calculating the
length of service in regard to pension rights affects a much larger
percentage of female workers than male workers, such a reality violates
Directive 76/207 as a form of indirect discrimination, so long as the
employer (or labor organization) cannot objectively justify its practices that
create the disparity.220 Regardless of whether the cause of action is direct
or indirect discrimination, however, the ECJ held that an employer (or labor
organization) has the burden of proving that when a plaintiff claims that the
principle of equal treatment has been infringed any adverse disparity is not
due to gender.221
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In Moreno v. I.N.S.S., the ECJ found the Spanish pension system not to
be covered by Article 157 (ex 143, 119).222 According to the ECJ, pension
systems that appear to be determined more so by considerations of social
policy rather than the relationship between an employer and an employee
are not covered by Article 157 (ex 141, 119).223 More specifically, because
the pension system at issue in Moreno concerned social policy, memberstate organization, and budgetary concerns, and did not apply to one
specific category of worker, Article 157 (ex 141, 119) was inapplicable.224
The Spanish pension law in question created a pension for life when a
person reaches 65 years of age, based on contributions for fifteen years.225
The pension system did provide for part-time workers, so long as the parttime worker contributed sufficiently based on hours worked, which
included traditional employment and overtime hours.226 The plaintiff, Ms.
Moreno, applied for a pension upon her retirement at age sixty-six, but was
refused eligibility by the Spanish government because she had not fully
contributed for fifteen years because she had only worked part-time, four
hours per week, for eighteen years.227 Ms. Moreno, while filing a
complaint with the Spanish administrative court, contended that the
contribution system punished part-time workers in that they had to
contribute for many more years to meet the fifteen-year equivalent rule, and
thus, resulted in a form of indirect discrimination because 80% of part-time
workers in Spain were female.228
As previously stated, the ECJ began its opinion by stating that Article
157 does not apply to a pension scheme which (1) is the creation of
statutory authority of the member-state, (2) its creation is based on social
policy, and (3) no bargaining exists between the employer and
employee(s).229 However, the ECJ did find the Spanish pension system to
violate Directive 79/7 because the system required a proportionally greater
contribution by part-time employees in comparison to full-time employees
given that the great majority of part-time employees are women.230
Directive 79/7 requires equal treatment of men and women in matters of
social security and provides specific protection in regard to age, which is
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considered a “risk” by the Directive.231 More narrowly, Directive 79/7
prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination on account of gender,
marital status, family status in regard to pension schemes, contributions,
calculations, related family benefits, and the retention and duration of
benefits.232 The ECJ was clear that Directive 79/7 is violated when a
member-state’s provision of law, although facially neutral, works to
disadvantage far more women than men and, in this case, the ECJ found it
to be indisputable that 80% of part-time workers are female.233 The ECJ
did not accept the Spanish government’s argument that the contribution
requirements and calculation systems were necessary to protect the social
security system, even if it meant excluding many part-time workers, such as
Ms. Moreno, from earning a lifetime pension.234
G. SUBCONTRACTORS AND OUTSOURCING OF EMPLOYMENT
Perhaps the best case that explores the right to equal pay in cases
involving part-time workers pursuant to Article 157 (ex 141, 119), is
Allonby v. Accrington & Rosendale College, largely because it is both
recent and on point.235 In Allonby, a female, part-time lecturer filed a claim
against the college where she taught and her direct employer (ELS) for
violating Article 157 (ex 141, 119), when she learned that a male
counterpart who held the same position was paid a higher salary by the
college.236 At one time, Ms. Allonby had been working directly for the
college, until budget cuts forced it to not renew her contract.237 However,
she went to work for her new employer, ELS, which hired several of the
part-time lecturers that were laid off by the college and Ms. Allonby ended
up teaching the same classes at the college, but she was directly employed
by ELS.238 Regardless, Ms. Allonby was paid less by ELS, essentially as a
subcontractor, than her male counterpart who was paid by the college.239 In
addition to filing a claim Article 157 (ex 141, 119), Ms. Allonby argued
that the college and ELS violated the British Sex Discrimination Act of
1975.240
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Although the ECJ found that Ms. Allonby was a “worker” within the
definition of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), she could not assert a claim under
that Article for sex discrimination because she and her male counterpart had
different employers, despite the fact that, physically, the two lecturers
taught at the same educational institution.241 According to the ECJ, this is
true even if the rate by which Ms. Allonby is paid is at least indirectly
determined by what the college pays ELS to contract its services.242 To
support its decision, the ECJ stated that because there is no one body that
could rectify the disparity in salary with two different employers, a claim
for equal pay could not be sustained.243
An additional point should be made regarding the ECJ’s opinion in
Allonby that certainly reflects the current condition for part-time workers.
The ECJ stated that part-time professors are still “workers” within the
confines of EU law, even if they are not forced to undertake an offered
assignment.244
Although provided with the opportunity to significantly broaden the
scope of the equal pay for equal work principle to apply across employers,
the ECJ refused to do so in Lawrence v. Regent Office Care Ltd.245 The
facts of Lawrence certainly provide insight for those involved, either as
employers, government agencies, and/or associated workers, with the
process of outsourcing. In Lawrence, the plaintiffs were workers that, at
one time, were directly employed by a U.K. government agency as cleaners
and caterers in various schools, but later became employees of a private
sector agency charged with the same responsibilities, but the latter
employer acquired those duties through outsourcing.246 However, while
still employed as cleaners and caterers for the local government agency, the
plaintiffs had successfully shown evidence of sex discrimination in regard
to remuneration as the local government agency accepted the results of a
job evaluation study showing the work of cleaners and caterers to be of
equal value in comparison to those working in gardening, refuse collection,
and sewage treatment, most of whom were men, but also worked for the
same local government agency.247 As the result of the proof of sex
discrimination pursuant to the equal pay for equal work principle, the wages
of the cleaners and caterers were raised to that of the workers engaged in
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gardening, refuse collection, and sewage treatment.248 Following the
outsourcing of cleaning and catering services to a private firm, the local
government agency employees were hired by the private firm at lower wage
rates.249 Those working for the private firm filed an action for sex
discrimination in regard to the equal pay for equal work principle with a
British administrative court.250 The employees claimed that Article 157 (ex
141, 119) applies to the condition whereby a private sector employer hires
workers whose labor has been earlier determined to be of equal value to
another set of workers directly employed by the same local government
agency that awards the contract to the private sector employer.251
The ECJ stated that the equal pay for equal work principle is directly
effective to member-states and also applies to both government employers
and private sector employers so that employees can rely on these
protections regardless of their employer.252 However, there were three
realities cited by the ECJ that made this case different. These include that
the employees being compared for equal work for equal pay purposes had
different employers, that the work performed by the cleaning and catering
employees was the same under the private sector employer as it was for the
local government agency, and that there was a continuation of the belief
that the work performed by the cleaners, caterers, gardeners, refuse
collectors, and sewage treatment workers was of equal value.253
Regardless, the ECJ held that the scope of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) only
applied to employees working for the same employer, and thus, the
plaintiffs could not rely on Article 157 (ex 141, 119) for relief because the
remuneration did not come from a single source; thus, no one organization
could remedy the disparity in pay despite the recognition that the parties are
performing work of equal value.254
H. CRITERIA FOR COMPENSATION
One of the leading cases on the subject of equal pay for equal work and
involving Directive 75/117 and Article 157 (ex 141, 119) is UCCE v.
Danfoss.255 In Danfoss, a labor organization brought a claim against an

248. Id. ¶ 5.
249. Id. ¶ 6.
250. Id. ¶¶ 8, 10.
251. Lawrence, E.C.R. I-07325, ¶¶ 8, 10.
252. Id. ¶ 13.
253. Id. ¶ 15.
254. Id. ¶¶ 17, 18.
255. Case C-109/88, Union of Commercial and Clerical Workers v. Danish Emp’rs’ Ass’n
ex rel Danfoss, 1989 E.C.R. 3119.

2017]

CLOSING THE GENDER PAY GAP

445

employers’ organization arguing the practice of using mobility, training,
and seniority as criteria for pay supplements that led men to be paid on
average more than women violated Directive 75/117.256 According to the
labor organization, because of the criteria for pay supplements, men on
average made 6.85% more than women and this reality was evidence of sex
discrimination.257
One of the key issues arising in the dispute between the parties in
Danfoss was transparency in that, according to the ECJ, Directive 75/117
requires that when a remuneration practice is not transparent to the workers,
the employer has the burden of proof to show that the practice is not the
cause of the disparity in pay between men and women.258 More specific to
the case at bar, the ECJ acknowledged that much of what supported the
employees’ action against the employers was the fact that a woman could
not know how the system of supplemental pay criteria is used to increase a
worker’s overall salary.259 Instead, women would only know the total
amount of supplemented pay and the workers in each wage group are
unable to compare the way in which the criteria were applied, but instead
can only compare the total amounts of remuneration.260 Thus, given this
lack of transparency, female workers are without a mechanism for which to
enforce the equal pay for equal work doctrine.261 The ECJ contended that
Directive 75/117 requires member-states to provide a legal forum for
litigants who believe their rights have been violated under the equal pay for
equal work doctrine.262 Additionally, as part of that legal process, the
employer must proffer evidence as to how and why the remuneration
practice, here the criteria used for pay supplements, does not violate the
equal pay for equal work standard, and thus also making the remuneration
system transparent.263
Determining whether the individual criteria violate the equal pay for
equal doctrine was the second issue addressed by the ECJ in Danfoss. The
ECJ stated that each criterion constituting the supplemental pay system
would have to be considered separately.264 On the use of “mobility” as a
supplemental pay criterion, the employer can only use such a criterion if the
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reward is for the ability to work variable hours, at various locations, and the
ability to adapt to different situations.265 In contrast, an employer cannot
use the mobility criterion if it is used to judge the quality of work.266 The
ECJ espoused some concern that employers may judge work by women as
simply inferior because the work was done by a woman.267 Training can be
used as a supplemental pay criterion, so long as the training is an important
part of improving the performance of the employee.268 According to the
ECJ, training, or a lack thereof, may be a greater problem for women due to
the inability to take advantage of training opportunities.269 Lastly, the
employer can reward employees based on length of service to the
employer.270 The ECJ also held that, when challenged with evidence that
male workers are paid more than female workers in positions of equal
value, an employer must justify the use of mobility and training as
supplemental pay criteria, but need not justify the use of supplemental pay
for length of service.271 The employer need not justify the use of length of
service as a supplemental pay criterion even if there is evidence that women
do not have longevity levels equal to men due to frequent interruptions in
their careers.272
In Cadman v. United Kingdom, the ECJ set forth several
pronouncements about the use of length of service criterion an employer
may use to determine pay for its employees.273 First, while citing
precedent, the ECJ stated that the principle of equal pay requires the
elimination of all sex discrimination regarding all forms of remuneration
whereby the equal value has attached to similar work.274 Second, Article
157 (ex 141, 119) should be interpreted to require the employer to prove
that its remuneration practices are justified by objective factors unrelated to
sex discrimination when evidence of discrimination exists.275 Third, any
means used by the employer to achieve its legitimate objectives must be
appropriate and necessary.276 Equally important are two provisions of EU
law. Directive 97/80 states that the principle of equal pay for equal work
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also applies to cases of indirect discrimination by an employer, and thus,
even apparently neutral employer policies on remuneration could illegally
favor one gender over another.277 As well, the same Directive places the
burden of proof on the employer in cases involving sex discrimination.278
The Directive also mandates that member-states allow those believing they
have been disadvantaged by an employer’s remuneration practices, as the
result of gender discrimination, to seek judicial review.279
More specific to the use of longevity as a means to compensate
workers, the ECJ stated that the use of rewarding experience on the job,
allows the worker in question to perform his or her duties at a high level
and also because the benefit of experience is the result of longevity, an
employer is free to use such a means to financially reward workers.280
Furthermore, according to the ECJ, when the use of longevity as a
remuneration criterion is only designed to reward workers for obtaining
experience, the employer need not justify the use of longevity.281 This is
true even if a worker, feeling disadvantaged by the system, provides
evidence of disparities in pay between men and women in regard to the
principle of equal work for equal pay when an employee could show that he
or she has obtained the experience necessary to reach the work level of a
person with many years of experience.282
The facts of Cadman are compelling. Ms. Cadman worked for the
same employer for many years under a traditional incremental system that
included a provision for longevity in order to pay workers after several
years of service.283 In 1992, the employer moved to a performance system
which adjusted the annual increment to reflect an employee’s individual
performance and all high performing employees to reach the top of the pay
scale more quickly.284 Ms. Cadman filed a complaint with the British
government after she was able to show that four men earned more than she
did for the same level of work, but who had been employed by the same
employer for longer periods of time.285 The British Court of Appeal, which
received the case after an administrative court had entertained it, reasoned
that a systematic prejudice existed in using longevity as a remuneration
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criterion because, in the U.K. and throughout the EU, the average length of
service to an employer for women is shorter than for men.286 The ECJ
contended that an employer need only justify the use of longevity as a
remuneration criterion when the employee provides evidence of a disparate
impact between men and women due to the use of the remuneration system
and there are serious doubts as to whether the objective of rewarding
experience is an appropriate objective.287
I. SICK LEAVE BENEFITS
Member-state legislation that provides for sick leave pay yet has the
effect of adversely impacting women, violates Article 157 (ex 141, 119).288
In Rinner-Kuhn v. FWW, the ECJ found fault with a German law that
required employers to pay wages for up to six weeks while a worker was
involuntarily on sick leave, however, employment contract required the
employee to work more than ten hours per week or more than forty-five
hours per month, and those that normally worked fewer hours were
excluded from the sick leave wage benefit.289 The plaintiff, a female who
worked roughly ten hours per week, was denied benefits by her employer
pursuant to the German legislation.290 According to the ECJ, the
continuation of pay while an employee is on sick leave is included within
the definition of pay as it pertains to Article 157’s guarantee that men and
women must be paid equally for equal work.291 Although facially neutral in
regard to gender, the ECJ found that once the German law made a
distinction between two categories of workers, those working more than ten
hours per week and those working less than ten hours per week, under
Article 157 (ex 141, 119), the German law would have to face scrutiny
because the sick leave benefit was considered a form of pay.292
Although the German law did not expressly separate men from women
in regard to the sick leave compensation benefit, the ECJ held so long as the
percentage of women that fall into the category of workers not receiving the
benefit is greater than the percentage of men who would benefit, the spirit
of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) is violated.293 The ECJ was firm in holding
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that only when such a member-state law is justified by objective factors not
related to sex discrimination could it be upheld in the face of Article 157
(ex 141, 119).294 For the legislation to be upheld, the member-state would
have to show that the means chosen meet a necessary aim of its social
policy and that the suitable and requisite for attaining that aim; and in this
case, if the member-state could substantiate that, then the mere difference in
impact between female and male workers would not be disastrous.295
However, it is for the national courts to decide whether a member-state’s
law impacts men and women workers differently, and whether that
difference is objectively tolerable or amounts to sex discrimination.296
J. GENDER REASSIGNMENT
In Richards v. Secretary of State for Work & Pensions, the ECJ held
that Directive 79/7/EEC prohibits a member-state from denying a person
who has undergone gender reassignment surgery the benefits that would
otherwise apply to that person associated with his or her new gender
identity.297 More specifically, the ECJ found a U.K. decision to deny a
potential pensioner, Ms. Richards, a government pension because she had
not reached the retirement age associated with her birth gender (male) to be
interpreted as precluding legislation.298 In 2002, Ms. Richards, born as a
male in 1942, petitioned the U.K. government for a pension after engaging
in gender reassignment surgery in 2001.299 However, the U.K. government
refused to approve the application for a pension contending that Ms.
Richards had to wait until she turned sixty-five.300 Somewhat confusingly,
the U.K. Gender Recognition Act allowed for a citizen to receive a gender
recognition certificate identifying the new gender when a citizen had
suffered from gender dysphoria and had acquired the new gender (via
surgical procedure) two years from the date of application for the
certificate.301
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The ECJ began its opinion by stating that it is the province of each
member-state to determine when a person has changed his or her gender.302
However, the ECJ also stated that the scope of Directive 79/7 is not only
confined to matters of discrimination based on male or female gender, but
also applies to the rights of equal treatment in regard to gender
reassignment.303 Moreover, the ECJ contended that the Directive seeks to
protect the full embodiment of social security rights and that the right not to
be discriminated against on grounds of sex is a fundamental human right
under EU law, and it is the ECJ’s role to ensure those rights.304 The ECJ
rejected the U.K.’s argument, at least in regard to relativity to the facts of
the case, that there was a need to have different pension eligibility ages for
men and women.305 The ECJ stated that EU law and its own case law
require, when applicable, that member-states comply with EU statutory and
case law despite the fact that both allow member-states to develop their
social security systems.306 According to the ECJ, although member-states
could have different pension eligibility ages within their social security
systems, member-states are not allowed to derogate from the protections
afforded those who wish to undergo a gender reassignment, and once that
occurs, a member-state cannot discriminate on the basis of gender
reassignment.307
K. LIFE PARTNERSHIPS
Showing progression toward the equality of marriage and a life
partnership between two people of the same gender, in Maruko v. Germany,
the ECJ held that once a member-state enacts legislation equating the two
forms of union, it must equally award survivor’s benefits.308 The case arose
when Mr. Maruko’s life partner died and he was denied a survivor’s
pension from the pension fund associated with his life partner’s
employment.309 At the time, German law recognized same-sex life
partnerships and set guidelines for obtaining such a recognition, which
included a requirement that the life partners agree to support and care for
each other and commit to a lifetime union, contribute to common needs of
the partnership through employment and property, and also required mutual
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family recognition.310 German law also provided for equality of pension
rights for survivors of marriages and life partnerships, specifically
identified equality between a spouse and a life partner, and recognized, on
equality grounds, the ending of a life partnership and a divorce.311
The employment of Mr. Maruko’s life partner, as a theatre worker,
mandated he be part of a collective bargaining agreement that afforded
pension benefits and associated survivor rights for married people, but
failed to recognize such pension and survivor rights for life partners.312 The
pension fund argued that it was not entitled to provide a survivor’s benefit
to Mr. Maruko because such a benefit should not be regarded as “pay”
within the confines of Directive 2000/78, which mirrors the language of
Article 157 (ex 141, 119), requiring equality in pay.313 The pension fund
also stated that because it is regulated by public law, and thus, is outside the
scope of Directive 2000/78 and Article 157 (ex 141, 119), as both laws
exclude state pension schemes that are created by statute, and the pension
system in question is not linked directly to specific employment but instead
was created based on social policy grounds.314
According to the ECJ, the survivor’s benefit at issue was within the
scope of “pay” for purposes of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), which includes
not only wages, salaries, and other forms of consideration, but also includes
benefits that are paid at the conclusion of an employment relationship.315
Furthermore, the ECJ also stated that the method by which a survivor’s
pension is calculated falls within the anti-discrimination provisions of
Article 157 (ex 141, 119).316 Most importantly, the ECJ found the theatre’s
pension fund to be outside of the exclusions of Article 157 (ex 141, 119)
and Directive 2000/78 because the workers were subject to a collective
bargaining agreement that was exclusive to only theatre workers, which
qualified as a specific category of workers and such workers must be part of
the collective bargaining profession to gain the benefits.317
On the more specific question of equality, the ECJ found that it was
Germany’s clear intent to treat same-sex life partnerships on the same level
as traditional marriages.318 Once that equality is legislated, Article 157 (ex
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141, 119) and Directive 2000/78 prohibit this form of direct discrimination
occurring when two groups of people, in comparable circumstances, are
treated in a way whereby one of the groups is handled less favorably than
the other.319
L. MATERNITY LEAVE
According to the ECJ in Abdoulaye v. Renault, the provisions for
financial remuneration during maternity leave, as a lump sum and the
continuation of paid salary, constitute pay pursuant to Article 157 (ex 143,
119) and Directive 75/117.320 Here, the plaintiffs were male employees
contending that the labor agreement between the workers and the employer
(Renault) provided for a lump sum to be paid to a female worker who
would also receive her traditional salary and social security contributions.321
However, if a male or female worker were to adopt a child, that worker
would only receive a lump sum.322 Interestingly enough, the male plaintiffs
limited their complaint, contending that Article 157 (ex 141, 119) and
Directive 75/117 were violated, to only the financial compensation
components of the lump sum and the continued salary and social security
components, and did not take issue with the labor agreement’s provision
that only women can take maternity leave.323
The ECJ reminded readers that Article 157 (ex 141, 119) applied to all
consideration that workers would receive, directly or indirectly, from their
employers.324 The ECJ added that the TFEU applied to cases even when
labor agreements and/or statutory provisions require payment to workers
(such as in the case of paid maternity leave) when workers are not
performing their duties.325 The ECJ next stated that for a claim of equal pay
for equal work to be successful, the male and female workers must be in
comparable positions.326 The employer, Renault, posited several reasons as
to why men and women workers are not comparable in regard to maternity
leave, including that women on maternity leave are not eligible for
promotion, the maternity leave period does not count toward longevity,
female workers are not eligible for performance-related salary increases,
and the returning female worker is not up to speed regarding technological
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advances in the workplace.327 In the end, the ECJ did not find that the
payment of salary and social security contributions, as well as a lump sum,
to only female workers while on maternity leave infringed upon Article 157
(ex 141, 119) because these payments are designed to compensate for the
occupational disadvantages associated with maternity leave.328
The difference between military leave, on the one hand, and parental
and maternity leave, on the other hand, and whether the participants in those
forms of leave are to be considered comparable pursuant to Article 157 (ex
141, 119) and Directive 75/117 in regard to the equal pay for equal work
principle were the subject matter in Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund v.
Wirtschaftskammer Osterreich.329 Here, the ECJ held that military service,
although almost exclusively the province of men, and parental and
maternity leave, which is almost exclusively engaged in by women, are not
comparable activities for the purposes of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) and
Directive 75/117.330
As is typical in Europe, the litigants were an employees’ labor
organization (the Gewerkschaftsbund) and an employers’ organization (the
Wirtschaftskammer Osterreich).331 The former argued that for purposes of
calculating the length of service period for an employer, the longer of which
makes a termination payment larger, should include the period by which an
employee takes parental leave, as is the case when a person in military (or
civilian) service, when absent, is entitled to have that time period included
within the length of service period for the purposes of calculating a
termination payment.332 The employees’ labor organization believed that
the discrepancy in treatment between the two forms of leave violated
Article 157 (ex 141, 119) because 98.253% of those on parental leave are
women, whereas only 1.747% are men, while virtually all military
personnel are men, and thus, the Austrian system resulted in a form of
indirect discrimination.333 In contrast to the position taken by the
employees’ labor organization, the employers’ organization contended that
those in military service and those taking parental leave are not comparable
for the purposes of the equal pay for equal work doctrine, because parents
take parental leave voluntarily which is unrelated to the employer’s

327. Id. ¶¶ 18- 19.
328. Id. ¶¶ 20, 22.
329.
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Wirtschaftskammer Osterreich, 2004 E.C.R. I-5907.
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conduct, and thus, length of service in cases of parental leave should not be
counted in regard to a termination payment.334 Furthermore, the employers’
organization argued there was no discrimination against women because
Austrian law creates a very favorable condition for those who wish to take
parental leave in that the employee cannot be dismissed from his or her
position.335
Austrian law, at the time of the case at bar, required a termination
payment under certain conditions and such payment was, in part, based on
the length of service to the employer.336 However, pregnant women were
not permitted to work during the last eight weeks of a pregnancy, during the
eight weeks after a traditional birth, if, at any time, the continuation of work
would endanger the life of the mother or child, or for twelve weeks after a
premature or caesarean birth.337 Furthermore, an employee can electively
take up to two years off from work to care for a child until the child reaches
two years of age.338 At no time can the period for which the employee was
removed from work be counted toward the length of service criterion for a
termination payment, regardless of when or why the employee was on
parental leave.339 Austrian law also set the requirements for military
service which included both compulsory service for men, and elective
service for women, which can be voluntarily extended by the military
personnel, but in all cases, the time spent in the military would count for
length of service for a termination payment.340
First, the ECJ stated that a termination payment was within the scope
of the term “pay” in Article 157 (ex 141, 119) and any unequal treatment in
regard to termination payments would be analyzed pursuant to that
Article.341 On the subject of comparability between workers on military
leave and those on parental leave, the ECJ found that these two sets of
workers were not comparable in regard to Article 157 (ex 141, 119),
because the purposes of the two forms of leave were different.342
Specifically, parental leave is voluntary and to care for a newborn, while

334. Id. ¶¶ 27, 28.
335. Id. ¶ 30.
336. Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund Gewerkschaft, 2004 E.C.R. I-5907, ¶ 6.
337. Id. ¶¶ 7-8.
338. Id. ¶ 10.
339. Id. ¶ 11. The relevant provisions of the Austrian law stated: “[u]nless otherwise
agreed, the period of [parental] leave shall not be taken into account for the purposes of
entitlements of a female employee based on length of service.” Id.
340. Id. ¶¶ 12-20.
341. Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund Gewerkschaft, 2004 E.C.R. I-5907, ¶¶ 37-38.
342. Id. ¶¶ 60-61.
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military leave is involuntary and part of a larger civic obligation.343 The
ECJ also commented that its jurisprudence allowed member-states to limit
compulsory military service to men.344 The ECJ made clear that the
suspension of employment for the greater interest of the member-state’s
defense could allow for different treatment in contrast to the suspension of
employment to take care of family interests.345
In a split decision on the scope and limitations of maternity leave, the
ECJ held that Article 157 (ex 143, 119) and Directive 75/117 do not require
that women on maternity leave receive the same salary they received while
engaged in full-time work, but that women on maternity leave should
receive any pay increases granted to other workers while they are on
maternity leave.346 In Gillespie v. Northern Ireland Health and Social
Services Boards, the ECJ also stated that, although women on maternity
leave are not guaranteed the same salary as when they were working, they
should not be paid so low as to undermine maternity leave’s purpose, and
any reviewing court assigned to determine the appropriate value of
maternity leave must take into account the length of the maternity leave and
other forms of social protection afforded by a member-state’s national
law.347 In this case, the ECJ heard a complaint by the plaintiffs who were
paid less than the amount they would have been paid while engaged in fulltime work, and held that such treatment violated Article 157 (ex 141, 119),
Directive 75/117, and Directive 76/207.348 The ECJ found that the amount
plaintiffs were paid on maternity leave, a full salary for the first four weeks,
nine-tenths of the salary for the two weeks thereafter, and one-half of the
salary for the final twelve weeks, was not below the level that would
undermine the purpose of maternity leave.349 Interestingly enough, the
amount paid to the plaintiffs was pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement which set the maternity leave pay higher than the statutory pay
rate of nine-tenths for the first six weeks and a flat-rate allowance for the
remainder of the maternity leave period.350
After restating the premise that Article 157 (ex 141, 119) and Directive
75/117 require the elimination of all discrimination that would interfere
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with the equal pay for equal work doctrine espoused in both laws, the ECJ
stated that income guaranteed in a collective bargaining agreement between
employees and an employer, which includes provisions for maternity leave,
is within the scope of the term “pay.”351
In Griesmar v. France, a predecessor to Leone v. France, the ECJ held
that a French law provided service credits associated with the national
pension system for female civil service workers for (1) each natural child
with established paternity, (2) each adopted child, and (3) each child falling
into a third category, so long as the child has been raised by the mother for
at least nine years prior to the child’s twenty-first birthday, including (a)
children from an earlier marriage, (b) children delegated of parental
authority in the name of the female civil servant or her husband, (c) children
placed in the guardianship of the female civil servant or her husband, and
(d) foster children placed with the female civil servant or her husband, to be
in violation of the Agreement on Social Policy which, according to the ECJ,
reproduces the rules set forth in Article 157 (ex 141, 119).352 The
Agreement on Social Policy went into effect on the day the Treaty of
Amsterdam went into force of which the latter reproduced and modified
Article 119 (now Article 157).353
In Griesmar, the plaintiff, a male civil servant and father of three
children was awarded a pension by the French government, yet the pension
granted did not take into consideration the service credits which would have
been awarded to a female civil servant in similar circumstances regarding
parenthood.354 The father argued that his status as a father is derived from
the reality that he has children, just as a woman’s status as a mother is
derived, and that the French pension law in question provides female civil
service workers with service credits on the sole basis of motherhood
without any proof that she raised the children, either naturally born or
adopted.355 Furthermore, attested the father, the service credits are not
designed to offset any occupational disadvantages the female civil service
worker would encounter because the grant of service credits is not attached
to any requirement of maternity leave and she earns these service credits
even if she had lost the status of civil servant or was not a civil servant at
the time of the birth or adoption.356 The French government stated that the

351. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12.
352. Case C-366/99, Griesmar v. Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie,
2001 E.C.R. I-09383, ¶¶ 5, 12, 13, 67.
353. Id. ¶ 21.
354. Id. ¶¶ 16-17.
355. Id. ¶ 49.
356. Id. ¶ 50.
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service credits are awarded to address any occupational or career challenges
female civil service workers who have had children would face due to the
reality that they are the predominant caretakers of children, regardless of
whether they have taken off time from their careers to do so.357 The ECJ,
however, noted that the French pension law did not allow male civil service
workers to earn the service credits, although they may have proof to
establish that they have been chiefly responsible for raising their birthed or
adopted children; thus, the French pension law created a difference on
gender grounds.358
The ECJ believed that the Agreement on Social Policy allowed
member-state governments to employ measures that would remove or
mitigate the actual instances of inequality facing women.359 Specifically,
on the question as to whether this difference in treatment grounds was
tolerable under Article 157 and the Agreement on Social Policy, the ECJ
found that the service credits provision benefitting only female civil service
workers would not offset the obstacles they faced.360
The ECJ did not find a link between the service credits awarded by the
French pension system, generally, and the application of those credits to
female civil service workers due to any career challenges they face because
the service credits were not linked to maternity leave or adoption leave and
thus female workers who did not take maternity leave did not face
occupational challenges.361 Although the ECJ found that the sole reason for
awarding the service credits was due to the belief that female civil service
workers raised the children they birthed or adopted, the legislative history
of the French pension law on that point indicated that the purpose of the
service credits was actually to make it easier for female civil service
workers to leave work and remain at home to raise their children.362
One of the most significant points in Griesmar was the ECJ’s comment
on the reach of Article 157 (ex 141, 119). The ECJ first stated the
traditional parameters of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), that member-states
which develop pension systems based on social policy, or concerns of
governmental organization, ethics, and/or budgetary issues, and do not
address a specific category of workers, are free to craft those pensions
systems without fear of infringing Article 157 (ex 141, 119).363 However,
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
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pursuant to the facts of the Griesmar case, the ECJ found that because civil
servants would constitute a specific category of workers, member-states that
create pension schemes to benefit those workers must follow the equal pay
requirement of Article 157.364
In Leone v. Gardes des Sceaux, the ECJ was asked to comment on
whether a French law that provided for early retirement and an immediate
pension for a civil servant with (1) either three children or a (2) child older
than one year old, with a disability of 80% or greater, so long as the civil
servant/parent was able to show that he or she took a career break of at least
two continuous months in the form of (1) maternity leave, (2) adoption
leave, (3) paternity leave, (4) parental care leave, or (5) parental leave
violated Article 157 (ex 141, 119).365 In addition to the aforementioned
conditions, French law required the civil servant to have taken the career
breaks just before the birth or adoption and the have ended the leave just
after the birth or adoption.366 Furthermore, the child must have been raised
by the civil servant for at least nine years with these breaks taking place
before the child’s sixteenth birthday or before the age at which they ceased
to be dependent.367 In addition to the right to an early retirement with an
immediate pension, the French law provided to the civil servant/parent a
four-trimester service credit.368 In Leone, the plaintiff was a male civil
servant/parent with three children who did not take career breaks during the
periods surrounding the birth of his children and was, thus, denied an early
retirement with an immediate pension by the French government.369
The ECJ acknowledged that the provisions of French law were neutral
in relation to the gender of the civil servant, yet, also acknowledged that the
impact of the French legislation would benefit a much higher proportion of
women than men.370 The French government, however, defended its policy
as a means to compensate for the career-related disadvantages of birthing
and/or adopting a new child.371 According to the ECJ, for the French law to
sustain a challenge in the face of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), the French
government would be required to show that it maintained a legitimate
policy aim through objective factors unrelated to gender and that the social
policy supporting the aim genuinely reflects the concern to attain that
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aim.372 The French government would also be required to show that the
social policy is pursued in a consistent and systematic manner in regard to
the legitimate policy aim.373
Interestingly, the ECJ cast doubt on whether the social policy, allowing
early retirement with an immediate pension for a civil servant maintaining
the aforementioned responsibilities connected to child rearing, would
actually compensate for career-related disadvantages arising from a career
break.374 The ECJ also mentioned that the French government had not
established how this social policy would meet its objectives.375
Specifically, the ECJ found three problems with the French government’s
social policy that would purportedly meet its aim. First, the ECJ seemed
unsure as to why the early retirement with an immediate pension should be
associated with having both a career break of two months and the fact that
the children must be raised by the civil servant for at least nine years.376
Second, it was unclear why there would be a difference in eligibility based
on whether the civil servant had a child with a disability of 80%.377 Third,
the ECJ believed there is no difference in the disadvantages associated with
a career break based on whether the civil servant had one or several
children.378
In an interesting twist, however, the ECJ stated that Article 157 (ex
141, 119) did not prohibit a member-state from creating a social policy that
creates specific advantages to make it easier for the underrepresented
gender to participate in a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for
disadvantages that the underrepresented gender may face in his or her
professional career.379 The ECJ saw the French law in question, which
created a right to early retirement with an immediate pension and service
credit granted for the career breaks that a civil servant/parent takes, as a
means to craft full equality between men and women in the workplace.380
M. PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
The ECJ addressed the problem of whether the equal pay for equal
work doctrine, pursuant to Article 157 (ex 143, 119), is violated when
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professionals of different academic backgrounds and different qualifications
perform the same work-related duties, yet one group is paid a higher salary
than another and the lower paid group is comprised of a higher number of
women.381 In the Staff Committee v. Health Fund case, the foundation of
the argument put forth by the Staff Committee largely rested on statistics
showing that Health Fund employed, within its clinic, twelve
psychotherapists including six doctors and six psychologists, and within
those two subsets, five doctors were men and five psychologists were
women.382 Health Fund also employed thirty-four psychotherapists within
its social insurance institutions, twenty-four of which were psychologists
and ten of which were doctors.383 Yet, only eighteen of those psychologists
were women and only two women were doctors.384 However, regardless of
whether the employee was a doctor or a psychologist, both sets of
professionals performed duties as psychotherapists, but the doctors were
paid more than the psychologists in accordance with a collective bargaining
agreement between the employees and the employer.385 The Staff
Committee argued that psychologists should be placed within the same
salary band as doctors, and without Health Fund doing so, Article 157 (ex
141, 119) and Directive 75/117 are violated.386
According to the ECJ, the equal pay for equal work doctrine requires
that employees be paid equally in regard to piece rates when the same unit
of measurement is used and that, as a rule, equal pay for work at time rates
applies when employees are performing the same job.387 The Staff
Committee contended that the ECJ should hold that doctors and
psychologists who perform the same work as psychotherapists should be
compensated at the same rate because, in a prior case, the ECJ held that
categories of employees with different professions and qualifications can
perform work of equal value; therefore, that rule should apply across the
board to cases whereby employees are performing the same work.388 In
contrast, Health Fund suggested that two groups of employees with
different professional qualifications, involving different obligations and
skills, are not engaged in the same work for the purposes of the equal work

381. Case C-309/97, Angestelltenbetriebsrat der Wiener Gebietskrankenkasse v. Wiener
Gebietskrankenkasse, 1999 E.C.R. I-02865, ¶ 9.
382. Id. ¶ 8.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id. ¶¶ 1-3, 5.
386. Id. ¶¶ 1, 5.
387. Angestelltenbetriebsrat der Wiener Gebietskrankenkasse, E.C.R. I-02865, ¶ 10.
388. Id. ¶¶ 11-12.
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for equal pay doctrine.389 Although the ECJ restated its belief that Article
157 (ex 141, 119) applied to situations whereby employees are in
comparable situations yet exposed to different rules, the ECJ reminded the
Staff Committee that its earlier jurisprudence only addressed the question of
work of equal value.390 It also agreed with Health Fund that doctors and
psychologists, even when performing the function of psychotherapist, are
not actually engaged in the same work.391 The ECJ believed that the
differences between doctors and psychotherapists was too great in regard to
the knowledge and skills they draw upon and also because doctors can
engage in many more activities, including psychotherapy, whereby
psychologists can only engage in psychotherapy.392 It was also important to
the ECJ that doctors and psychologists were recruited by Health Fund for
their different backgrounds.393 Additionally, the ECJ stated that it was
irrelevant that the fee charged to clients for psychotherapy services,
regardless of whether those services were performed by a doctor or a
psychologist, was the same.394 Nevertheless, the ECJ stated that reviewing
courts in similar cases should evaluate the two subsets of workers based on
several factors, such as the nature of the work, any associated training
requirements, and working conditions, to determine if the equal pay for
equal work doctrine should apply.395
IV. THEMES DISCOVERED FROM AN EXAMINATION OF ECJ
CASELAW ON EQUAL PAY
The compilation of caselaw in this Article reflects several themes.
First, any entity considering employing people in the EU should be
concerned with the terms included in the definition of pay for the purposes
of Article 157 (ex 141, 119). Despite the lack of an express definition in
Article 157 (ex 141, 119), the ECJ has espoused a wide definition of pay to
remove the vestiges of pay discrimination that existed in the EU’s past
employment world. According to the ECJ, retirement contributions and
pension plans are within the confines of pay pursuant to Article 157 (ex
141, 119).396 In Worringham, the ECJ was deliberate to include within the

389. Id. ¶ 13.
390. Id. ¶¶ 12, 16, 20.
391. Id.
392. Id. ¶ 20.
393. Angestelltenbetriebsrat der Wiener Gebietskrankenkasse, E.C.R. I-02865, ¶ 21.
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scope of Article 157 any form of remuneration that affected equality.397 In
Bilka, pension plans, even voluntarily created by employment agreements
between employers and workers, are examined through the lens of Article
157 (ex 141, 119); however, the ECJ held that part-time workers could be
excluded from the pension scheme if objectively justified.398 The definition
of pay under Article 157 (ex 141, 119) also includes non-working related
activities such as lump-sum payments for maternity leave and termination
payments for maternity and military leave.399 More broadly, service credits
associated with maternity leave also constitute a form of pay.400
Additionally, employers must acknowledge the equal pay requirements of
Article 157 (ex 141, 119) when providing redundancy pay in both the
public and private sectors.401 In-kind benefits issued to employees, even
when the employer provides them out of choice and not due to an
obligation, are covered by Article 157 (ex 141, 119).402 Likewise, benefits
associated with an employee’s sick leave must adhere to the equal pay
doctrine.403
Despite the previously-mentioned jurisprudence on the terms included
within the definition of pay for the purposes of Article 157 (ex 141, 119),
there are three cases that, perhaps, best show the breadth of the equal pay
doctrine. In Danfoss, the ECJ held that the criteria used to determine pay
supplements, and each criterion separately within the pay supplement
scheme, will be scrutinized under Article 157 (ex 141, 119).404 However,
the one criterion within a supplemental pay scheme used by an employer
that will not be scrutinized is supplemental pay based on length of
service.405 The ECJ’s decision in Seymour-Smith also expands the breadth
of the equal pay doctrine as the ECJ held that a judgment, and the related
award tied to an equal pay discrimination case, must be evaluated based on

397. Worringham, E.C.R. 0767, ¶¶ 25, 28.
398. Bilka, 1986 E.C.R. 1607, ¶¶ 22-23, 31.
399. Case C-218/98, Abdoulaye v. Renault, 1999 ECR I-05723, ¶¶ 4-5, 12; Case C-342/93,
Gillespie v. N. Health & Soc. Servs. Boards, 1996 E.C.R. I-492, ¶ 21; Case C-220/02, Case C220/02, Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund Gewerkschaft v. Wirtschaftskammer Osterreich,
2004 E.C.R. I-5907, ¶ 65.
400. Case C-366/99, Griesmar v. Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie,
2001 E.C.R. I-09383, ¶¶ 64-65.
401. Case C-262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Grp., 1990 E.C.R. I-01889,
¶¶ 16-17, 19-20.
402. Case 12/81, Garland v. British Rail Eng’g Ltd., 1982 E.C.R. 0359, ¶¶ 5, 9 (“Grounds”).
403. Case C-171/88, Rinner-Kuhn v. FWW Spezial-Gebaeudereinigung GmbH & Co., 1989
E.C.R. 2743, ¶ 16.
404. Case C-109/88, Union of Commercial and Clerical Workers v. Danish Emp’rs’ Ass’n
ex rel Danfoss, 1989 E.C.R. 3119, ¶ 18.
405. Id. ¶ 24.
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Article 157 (ex 141, 119).406 The Maruko decision will likely be most
noteworthy for its fact pattern involving a member-state’s recognition of
same-sex marriage, but for the purposes of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), the
decision will be noted for the extension of the equal pay doctrine to
survivor’s benefits.407
Second, although the ECJ has maintained a broad conceptual definition
of pay for the purposes of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), there does exist some
discretion for member-states and employers.408 This discretion exists
despite the ECJ’s declaration in Barber that every national court must work
to remove all discrimination that contradicts the tenets of the equal pay
doctrine and despite the ECJ’s holding in Seymour-Smith, whereby
employers may be asked to objectively justify their decisions in creating
remuneration systems and rhetorically asked whether there is a better
method to create these systems without the effect of disadvantaging female
workers.409 Member-states have the discretion to craft a retirement system
based on its own social and employment policies and are free to do so long
as the social policy is not tied to discrimination.410 In fact, a pension
system can be developed around a member-state’s social policy, if the
social policy is not based solely on the employer-employee relationship.411
For example, the ECJ held in Moreno that a retirement system can be based
on age and years of service, in accordance with Article 157 (ex 141, 119),
so long as the system is based on that member-state’s social policy, the
member-state’s organization, the member-state’s budgetary concerns, and
does not single out one category of worker.412 Relatedly, and somewhat
remarkably, member-states are still allowed to maintain different retirement
ages for each gender.413 Perhaps the best example of an allowable memberstate social policy that passed Article 157 (ex 141, 119) muster is the ECJ’s
decision in Leone whereby the ECJ held that a member-state can implement
an early retirement system to assist an underrepresented group (such as
female workers) so long as it is clear that the member-state is attempting to
406. Case C-167/97, Regina v. Seymour-Smith, 1999 E.C.R I-00623, ¶¶ 28-29, 36.
407. Case C-267/06, Maruko v. German Theatre Pension Inst., 2008 E.C.R. I-1757, ¶¶ 4244, 73.
408. Case C-262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Grp., 1990 E.C.R. I-01889,
¶¶ 38-39; Regina, E.C.R. I-00623, ¶¶ 68, 70-72.
409. Case C-262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Grp., 1990 E.C.R. I-01889,
¶¶ 38-39; Regina, E.C.R. I-00623, ¶¶ 68, 70-72.
410. Regina, 1999 E.C.R. I-00623, ¶¶ 72, 74-75.
411. Case C-385/11, Moreno v. Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Soc., 2012 E.C.R. 00000,
¶¶ 22-25.
412. Id. ¶¶ 23-25.
413. Case C-423/04, Richards v. Sec’y of State for Work &Pensions, 2006 E.C.R. I-3602,
¶¶ 34-35, 38 (“Grounds”).
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close the gender gap or presumably, any gap, between an overrepresented
and underrepresented group.414
As previously stated, the Maruko case will have a profound effect in
the future based on its fact pattern involving same-sex relationships, but it
also reflects a member-state’s discretion in determining which relationships
it equates to a traditional marriage. However, once that determination is
made and a non-traditional relationship is equated to a traditional
relationship, the discretion is removed and a member-state must apply the
tenets of the equal pay doctrine.415 Relatedly, the discretion associated with
equality of relationships, once made, cannot be trumped by a collective
bargaining agreement and such an agreement must acknowledge the
member-state’s extension of equality.416 In the ECJ’s Richards decision, a
case with similar progressive issues involved, a member-state was granted
the discretion to determine when a person’s gender has changed, legally.417
In Rinner-Kuhn, a case that is likely reflective of the broadest swath of
member-state discretion, the ECJ stated that in equal pay cases the memberstate’s national courts can determine whether genders are treated differently
based on the facts of a case and also, after having determined if inequality
has occurred, whether that difference in treatment is tolerable.418 A
member-state also has the ability to create differences in salary and benefits
for public servants.419
There are limits on the discretion of both member-states as well as
employers. Employers cannot use professional qualifications as the sole
reason for differences in salaries if two groups of workers are performing
the same work or work of equal value, even if one group has greater
professional qualifications than the other.420 The most significant limitation
on a member-state’s discretion pursuant to Article 157 (ex 141, 119) is a
general, but broad stroke, prohibition against categorically treating workers
differently.421

414. Case C-173/13, Leone v. Garde des Sceaux, 2014 E.C.R. 00000, ¶ 100 (“Grounds”).
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418. Case C-171/88, Rinner-Kuhn v. FWW Spezial-Gebaeudereinigung GmbH & Co., 1989
E.C.R. 2743, ¶ 15.
419. Cases C-124/11, C 125/11, and C 143/11, Germany v. Dittrich, 2012 E.C.R. 00000, ¶
41.
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Gebietskrankenkasse, 1999 E.C.R. I-02865, ¶¶ 12, 16, 20.
421. Case C-366/99, Griesmar v. Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie,
2001 E.C.R. I-09383, ¶¶ 30-31, 35.
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The third major theme espoused in the caselaw is that, although the
great majority of forms of remuneration and compensation during
employment and after employment are within the scope of Article 157 (ex
141, 119), there is a noticeable disconnect between what is covered by
Article 157 (ex 141, 119) and what member-states and employers are
obligated to do under Article 157 (ex 141, 119). Perhaps the best example
of this reality is the ECJ’s decision in Barber, whereby the ECJ held that
firms, as employers, are not permitted to have different retirement ages for
men and women even if the member-state government in which they
operate maintains different ages for retirement.422 Regardless of any
disconnect, member-states or employers attempting to treat male and female
employees differently will likely have the burden to show that Article 157
(ex 141, 119) is not violated.423 Relatedly, employers should know that
regardless of whether they operate in the public or private sector, Article
157’s equal pay requirement applies.424
There are two rules that provide the greatest disconnect between what
is and what is not scrutinized by Article 157 (ex 141, 119). First, the ECJ’s
jurisprudence in both Danfoss and Cadman, stating that length of service
criterion for any form of remuneration is immune from Article 157’s
scrutiny even if there is evidence of a discriminatory impact, seems to be a
puzzling separation.425 The decision in Cadman helps close the separation
a bit between what is and what is not scrutinized by Article 157 (ex 141,
119) in that the ECJ stated that an employer does not have to defend its use
of a length of service provision in a remuneration scheme, so long as the
length of service provision is only for the purposes of acquiring and
rewarding experience.426 Taken together, however, the Danfoss and
Cadman decisions do not help close the noticeable gap in experience
maintained by the men and women mentioned in several cases and included
in this Article. The Cadman decision also widens the gap between what is
and what is not permitted by Article 157 (ex 141, 119) in that it allows
employers to change the criteria used to determine remuneration even when
an employee has already begun employment.427

422. Case C-262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Grp., 1990 E.C.R. I-01889,
¶ 32.
423. Case 96/80, Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Prods.) Ltd., 1981 E.C.R. 0911, ¶¶ 12-13,
15 (“Grounds”).
424. Barber, E.C.R. I-1944, ¶¶ 28, 29.
425. Case C-109/88, Union of Commercial and Clerical Workers v. Danish Emp’rs’ Ass’n
ex rel Danfoss, 1989 E.C.R. 3119, ¶ 24; Case C-17/05, Cadman v. Health & Safety Exec., 2006
E.C.R. I-09583, ¶ 39.
426. Id. ¶ 38.
427. Id. ¶ 13.
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Within this same realm of confusion is the Bilka decision, whereby the
ECJ stated that, pursuant to Article 157 (ex 141, 119), employers are
permitted to exclude part-time workers from pension schemes, so long as
the goal is to promote full-time work over part-time work, even if there is a
negative impact on women (most likely in that they make up a larger
proportion of part-time workers).428 Similarly, in the Nikoloudi decision,
the ECJ stated that employers can pay full-time workers a higher wage than
part-time workers, although indirect discrimination may result if there is
evidence that a greater percentage of female workers are adversely
affected.429 Therefore, it appears that by taking the Bilka and Nikoloudi
decisions together, an employer may exclude part-time workers from its
pension system and pay them less without infringing Article 157 (ex 141,
119), so long as, in regard to pay, the percentage of women in the part-time
ranks is not too great. In such a case whereby a reviewing court found
evidence of indirect discrimination, an employer need only raise the wages
of the part-time workers, but need not move the part-time workers into the
pension system.
Although Article 157 (ex 141, 119) does not identify men or women as
a group more so in need of equal pay recognition, one would believe that it
would protect both genders, equally. In Abdoulaye, the ECJ stated that
employers could, without violating Article 157 (ex 141, 119), allow women
to receive salary, social security contributions, and a lump sum while on
maternity leave, without providing their male counterparts with the same
benefits.430 This decision seems to contradict the holding in Gillespie,
whereby the ECJ stated that women must receive salary increases while on
maternity leave and that maternity leave cannot be compensated at such a
low rate as to undermine the purpose of maternity leave.431 Relatedly, in
OGGP, the ECJ held that, although admittedly different forms of benefits, a
member-state can treat military service and maternity differently, even if
the former is almost exclusively the province of men and the latter is almost
exclusively the province of women, at least in regard to termination
payments.432
Two cases, Allonby and Lawrence, illustrate the most significant
disconnect between the mission of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) and what is not
considered equal pay discrimination. Taken together, these cases stand for
428. Case 170/84, Bilka v. Weber von Hartz, 1986 E.C.R. 1607, ¶¶ 33, 37, 43.
429. Case C-196/02, Nikoloudi v. O.T.E., 2005 E.C.R. I-01789, ¶¶ 38, 53.
430. Case C-218/98, Abdoulaye v. Renault, 1999 ECR I-05723, ¶¶ 20, 22.
431. Case C-342/93, Gillespie v. N. Health & Soc. Servs. Boards, 1996 E.C.R. I-492, ¶ 21.
432.
Case C-220/02, Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund Gewerkschaft v.
Wirtschaftskammer Osterreich, 2004 E.C.R. I-5907, ¶¶ 60-61, 65.
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the idea that an employer can outsource employment to a subcontractor and
indirectly pay those working for the subcontractor, who are performing the
same work as the employer’s previous employees performed, a lower
amount even if there is a disparate difference between the employees still
working for the employer and those working for the subcontractor in regard
to gender.433 According to Lawrence, the employees working first for the
employer, and then for the subcontractor, who engaged in the same work on
the same physical grounds, can be paid less by the subcontractor.434
Lastly, a note should be made concerning part-time workers and
Article 157’s equal pay requirement. Frankly speaking, part-time workers
are not well protected by Article 157 (ex 141, 119). As previously stated,
part-time workers can be excluded from pension plans to promote the
attraction of full-time employment.435 It is also acceptable, according to
Article 157 (ex 141, 119), to pay part-time workers less than full-time
workers.436 Perhaps the only source of equality for part-time workers lies
within Directive 79/7 which requires employers not to prejudice part-time
workers in regard to pension contributions assuming the employer allows
the part-time workers to be part of the pension system.437
V.

THREATS TO EQUAL PAY IN THE FUTURE IN THE EU

As mentioned in Section I, the addition of new member-states to the
EU has reduced the push for equal pay within the twenty-eight-memberstate bloc.438 If this continues, one of the chief threats to the equal pay for
equal work doctrine is the expansion of the EU. As the EU exists today,
different cultures, social systems, and histories have created several
variations of equality across the member-states despite the fact that Article
157 (ex 141, 119) is directly effective in each member-state and no
implementing legislation is needed to bind member-states to the equal pay
for equal work doctrine. Two questions that should be addressed in regard
to equal pay is whether the EU will become more complacent with the
differences across the member-states and whether the movement toward
completely erasing the pay gap between male and female workers will be
sidelined. Member-state national courts were given the discretion in

433. Case C-320/00, Lawrence v. Regent Office Care Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-07325, ¶¶ 17-19.
Case C-256/01, Allonby v. Accrington., 2004 E.C.R. I-00873, ¶ 79.
434. Lawrence, E.C.R. I-07325, ¶¶ 17, 18.
435. Case 170/84, Bilka v. Weber von Hartz, 1986 E.C.R. 1607, ¶¶ 33, 37.
436. Case 170/84, Bilka v. Weber von Hartz, 1986 E.C.R. 1607, ¶¶ 33, 37.
437. Case C-385/11, Moreno v. Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Soc., 2012 E.C.R. 00000,
¶¶ 33-36.
438. See supra Section I.
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Rinner-Kuhn to determine whether a particular gender was being treated in
a discriminatory fashion and whether this discrimination reached a level of
intolerability.439 Much akin to the moral hazard associated with the ECJ’s
decisions in Allonby and Lawrence, providing the member-state national
courts with so much leeway in determining whether tolerable discrimination
exists, creates too much risk that the cultures, social values, and histories of
the various member-states will trump the intent of Article 157 (ex 141,
119), to the point in which female (and male) workers are more easily
discriminated against in regard to remuneration. Such a checkerboard
approach to equal pay could create the lack of harmony that Article 157 (ex
141, 119) specifically, and the TFEU generally, sought to avoid. Given EU
citizen workers’ right to free movement under Article 45 (ex 39, 48), it is
foreseeable that workers would move to member-states that maintain a
greater level of equality.440 Likewise, pursuant to a firm’s right to
establishment under Article 49 (ex 43, 52), employers would move to
member-states that permit greater discretion in treating workers
unequally.441 The holding in Rinner-Kuhn also seems to contradict the
decision in Barber whereby the ECJ stated that national courts must work

439. Case C-171/88, Rinner-Kuhn v. FWW Spezial-Gebaeudereinigung GmbH & Co., 1989
E.C.R. 2743, ¶ 15.
440. Article 45 (ex 39, 48) states:
1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Union. 2. Such
freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on
nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment,
remuneration and other conditions of work and employment. 3. It shall entail the right,
subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public
health: (a) to accept offers of employment actually made; (b) to move freely within the
territory of Member States for this purpose; (c) to stay in a Member State for the
purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions governing the employment
of nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or administrative action; (d) to
remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State,
subject to conditions which shall be embodied in regulations to be drawn up by the
Commission. 4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the
public service.
TFEU art. 45.
441. Article 49 (ex 43, 52) states:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State
shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting-up
of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in
the territory of any Member State. Freedom of establishment shall include the right to
take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage
undertakings, in particular companies or firms within the meaning of the second
paragraph of Article 54, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the
law of the country where such establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of
the Chapter relating to capital.
TFEU art. 49.
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to remove all discrimination based on equality of pay.442 Questioning this
rhetorically, is it possible to both command national courts to remove all
discrimination based on equal pay, yet provide them with the discretion to
determine whether a particular group is being treated disadvantageously and
to what extent that disadvantage is tolerable.
The ECJ’s decision in Allonby and Lawrence serves as a real threat to
the expansive scope of Article 157’s equal pay requirement. Both cases
allow an employer to dismiss certain employees and replace them with a
subcontractor’s workers who are engaged in the same form of work, yet the
employer is able to reduce its labor costs by paying less to the
subcontractor’s workers.443 In such a scenario, the funds to pay the
subcontractor’s workers originate with the employer and pass through the
subcontractor. With these decisions in place, an employer has a method to
reduce costs and a significant incentive to do so even if it is shown that the
work being performed happens to maintain a comparatively high percentage
of women. As previously stated, women workers are more likely to suffer
from layoffs. One can only imagine the threat to various professions
whereby women dominate the employment landscape and then an employer
decides to subcontract. The decision in Allonby, which specifically
commented that Article 157 does not apply because no one employer can
remediate the problem, could be easily reversed to prevent the moral hazard
associated with the incentive to subcontract employees.444
The Cadman decision is troublesome in light of the mission of Article
157 (ex 141, 119) and likewise poses a threat to pay equality. In several
cases in this Article, the ECJ showed concern for female workers that might
be disadvantaged because they are more likely to take on the
responsibilities of home life and sacrifice time in the workplace. However,
the ECJ’s holdings in both Cadman and Danfoss allow an employer to craft
a remuneration policy that benefits the employee’s length of service which
can be maintained even if there is evidence of a discriminatory impact, so
long as the employer is using the length of service criterion for the purpose
of acquiring and rewarding experience.445 Thus, the ECJ has opened a
pathway for unequal pay in that women, who are recognized as being more

442. Case C-262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Grp., 1990 E.C.R. I-01889,
¶¶ 33-34.
443. Case C-256/01, Allonby v. Accrington., 2004 E.C.R. I-00873, ¶ 74; Case C-320/00,
Lawrence v. Regent Office Care Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-07325, ¶¶ 18-19.
444. See Allonby, E.C.R. I-00873, ¶ 74.
445. Case C-109/88, Union of Commercial and Clerical Workers v. Danish Emp’rs’ Ass’n
ex rel Danfoss, 1989 E.C.R. 3119, ¶ 24. Case C-17/05, Cadman v. Health & Safety Exec., 2006
E.C.R. I-09583, ¶¶ 39, 40.
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likely to remove themselves from the workplace to care for family
responsibilities and thus would have fewer years of service to an employer,
would be disadvantaged in regard additional remuneration. To be fair, the
ECJ warned employers that a length of service criterion could not be used if
there exists evidence that rewarding experience is not an appropriate
objective.446 Despite this qualification, it is difficult to think of an instance
whereby rewarding experience would not be an appropriate objective, or at
least, whereby rewarding experience would be defensible. It is unclear as to
whether the ECJ’s holding in Gillespie, that salary increases extended to
workers must also be extended to those on maternity leave, could perhaps
make up for the lost time in regard to remuneration based on length of
service.447
The next threat to the equal pay doctrine consists of the inability of the
ECJ to develop independently, or in conjunction with other EU institutions,
a formula to determine comparable worth in regard to the three stages of
equal pay. A strong argument could be made that the EU legislative bodies
should enact a Regulation, or at least a Directive, that puts into place a
standard, based on a formula for determining comparable worth, and give
the ECJ the responsibility for enforcing that standard. This reality would
remove some of the bias that might potentially exist pursuant to the ECJ’s
decision in Rinner-Kuhn. Related to this suggestion is the possibility that
the EU legislative institutions and/or the ECJ develop a statistical standard
to determine when a group has been disadvantaged enough to the point that
Article 157 (ex 141, 119) would require a remedy. In Seymour-Smith, the
ECJ articulated a three-part test to determine whether a member-state’s
policy has an unfavorable impact on women.448 First, an unfavorable
impact must be recognized.449 Second, there must exist proper proportions
of men and women in the general population in comparison to those men
and women affected by the member-state’s policy.450 Third, the ECJ must
determine whether that disparity has existed consistently over time.451 In
this particular case, the ECJ found that a near 9% differential was not
evidence of disadvantage at a level to violate Article 157 (ex 141, 119).452

446. Id. ¶ 38.
447. Case C-342/93, Gillespie v. N. Health & Soc. Servs. Boards, 1996 E.C.R. I-492, ¶¶ 21,
64.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.

Case C-167/97, Regina v. Seymour-Smith, 1999 E.C.R I-00623, ¶¶ 58, 59, 61-62.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 63-65.
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To create complete equality across genders, two cases that the ECJ
could reexamine include Richards and Abdoulaye. These cases upheld a
member-state’s ability to maintain different retirement ages for different
genders and a maternity leave system that favored women over men.453
Again, although the culture, history, and social system of each memberstate plays a role and the ECJ attempts to provide discretion where possible,
requiring the same retirement age for men and women and making
maternity leave more appealing to men would assist in cementing the
concept of equal pay based on gender. The author of this Article, however,
is cognizant of the fact that such a reversal and in-turn mandate for equality
could place the progress of harmonization of equal pay based on gender at
risk.
Lastly, and perhaps the most challenging effort the EU as a whole can
take to improving the condition of the equal pay doctrine across the
continent, is to broaden the scope of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) to require an
inter-member-state requirement that employers must treat their workers
equally based on gender. In other words, an employer operating in two or
more EU member-states must adhere to the equal pay doctrine in each of
those member-states. By example, an employer operating in Sweden and
Germany must compensate equally the female workers in Sweden and the
male workers in Germany if those workers are engaged in work of
comparable value. Such a broadening of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) would
also mitigate the possibility that an employer would relocate its operations
to a member-state that takes a more relaxed view of the equal pay doctrine
legally, historically, and/or culturally. As well, gains for women associated
with the equal pay doctrine across the EU, as identified in Section I, could
be better realized.
VI. CONCLUSION
As previously stated, one estimate is that full pay equality will not exist
in the EU until 2058 which represents at least one full generation from the
time of this Article. In Richards v. United Kingdom, the ECJ held that it is
a fundamental human right not to be discriminated based on gender and that
such a right is embedded in EU law.454 However, despite all of the progress
made by the ECJ in ensuring member-states and employers within the
twenty-eight-country EU adhere to the equal pay doctrine, the ECJ’s
decisions in Cadman, Allonby, Lawrence, and Rinner-Kuhn threaten to
453. Case C-423/04, Richards v. Sec’y of State for Work &Pensions, 2006 E.C.R. I-3602,
¶¶ 34-35, 38; Case C-218/98, Abdoulaye v. Renault, 1999 ECR I-05723, ¶¶ 20, 22.
454. Richards, E.C.R. I-3602, ¶¶ 22-24.
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dismantle some of the progress by potentially creating twenty-eight
different standards for equal pay. The real progress of the ECJ has been in
developing and broadening the scope of the term “pay” within the
framework of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) given that the Article is deplete of a
definition of pay. The term has been expanded to include virtually all
forms of remuneration including retirement contributions, in-kind benefits,
redundancy pay, civil judgments, pay supplements, sick leave benefits, pay
during maternity leave, pay during military leave, termination payments,
and service credits.
The ECJ could provide greater protection against potential unequal pay
by tightening the discretion espoused in Cadman and Rinner-Kuhn and
reversing its decisions in Allonby and Lawrence by closing the door left
open by those decisions which allow an employer to gain the same work at
a lower wage rate, and possibly from the same workers, through an
outsourcing and subcontractor arrangement.

